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I.

INTRODUCTION

During the last several decades, international athletes' presence in
professional American sports has reached unprecedented levels. Not
all premier professional American sports leagues, however,
accommodate internationalization to the same extent. While the
National Football League (NFL), the National Hockey League (NiL),
the National Basketball Association (NBA), and Major League
Baseball (MLB) do not impose limits on international entrants into
their leagues, Major League Soccer (MLS) does. Under a policy
established at the league's founding in 1996 (the MILS Policy or the
Policy), no MLS team may stock its twenty-person senior roster with
any more than eight international players.!
From the very beginning, therefore, MLS was designed to
exclude. This, in some respects, renders MLS not unlike its sister
leagues, all of which have historically discriminated. These other
leagues' discriminatory policies, however, precluded based on race
rather than citizenship status and have long since lapsed. The NFL,
1.
Major League Soccer, 2009 MLS Player Rules & Regulations Summary (2009),
http://web.mlsnet.com/about (follow the "Regulations" hyperlink).
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which was founded in 1920,2 expurgated blacks in 1934, but
reintegrated twelve years later, in 1946.? The American League and
the National League, the two leagues comprising MLB, also included
blacks initially and later barred them.' They, however, relaxed their bar
in 1947, a year after the NFL did so.' In 1950, the NBA admitted its
first black player,6 and eight years later, the NHL did the same
So, when MLS began play in 1996, it became the first American
sports league in nearly half a century to openly discriminate in the
construction of its teams as a matter of league-wide policy.' Because

2.
The NFL originally operated as the American Professional Football Association
and in 1921 reorganized and changed its name to the American Professional Football League.
PATRICK CLARK, SPORTS FIRSTS 37 (1981). In 1922, it changed its name yet again, this time
to the National Football League. National Football League, History, http://www.nfl.com/
history/chronology/1921-1930 (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
3.
See ARTHUR R. ASHE, JR., A HARD ROAD TO GLORY: A HISTORY OF THE AFRICANAMERICAN ATHLETE SINCE 1946, at 116 (1988).
4.
See CLARK, supra note 2, at 12. Having been excluded from America's premier
professional baseball leagues, black baseball players and enthusiasts formed their own
leagues. See ARTHUR R. ASHE, JR., A HARD ROAD TO GLORY: A HISTORY OF THE AFRICANAMERICAN ATHLETE SINCE 1919-1945, at 27-30 (1988); KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK
AND WHITE: RACE AND SPORTS INAMERICA 46-47 (1996). These leagues, known collectively

as the Negro Leagues, "were unique on the American athletic landscape, providing successful
alternative outlets for black baseball players to display their talents." N. Jeremi Duru,
Fieldinga Team for the Fans." The Societal Consequencesand Title VImplicationsofRaceConsideredRoster Constructionin ProfessionalSport 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 375, 383 (2006).
5.
SHROPSHIRE, supra note 4, at 29. Although Kenny Washington and Woody Strode
reintegrated the NFL a year earlier, "[w]hen Jackie Robinson [re]integrated Major League
Baseball in 1947, that event was hailed as the biggest civil rights success since the Civil War."
Id. at 19. Robinson's MLB debut likely received greater attention because professional
baseball was at the time substantially more popular among Americans than professional
football. SeeASHE, supranote 3, at 2-4, 116-17.
6.
HOWARD BRYANT, SHuT OuT: A STORY OF RACE AND BASEBALL IN BOSTON 143
(2002); HARVEY ARATON & FILiP BONDY, THE SELLING OF THE GREEN: THE FINANCIAL RISE
AND MORAL DECLINE OF THE BOSTON CELTICS 50-51 (1992). The NBA's first black player
was Chuck Cooper, drafted by the Boston Celtics out of Duquesne University. Id Later in
the 1950 season, the New York Knicks added to their roster Nat "Sweetwater" Clifton and the
Washington Capitols added Earl Lloyd. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 4, at 31. Notably, although
Lloyd joined the NBA after Cooper, Lloyd was the first black player to participate in an NBA
game. Id
7.
CLARK, supra note 2, at 69. The NHI{1s f'ast black player was the Boston Bruins'
Willie O'Ree, who entered the NHL in 1958. Id
8.
Notably, although decades have passed since teams in the NFL, NHL, NBA, and
MLB engaged in overt racial discrimination, covert discrimination continued well after the
leagues initially integrated--or in the case of the NFL and MLB, reintegrated. See, e.g.,
ASHE, supra note 3, at 5, 115-16. Indeed, reflecting on the baseball context, Arthur Ashe, the
tennis great and eminent sports historian notes:
The period from Jackie Robinson's debut in April 1947 to 1953 can best be
described as one of token integration. In this seven-year stretch, the National
League added blacks at the rate of three every two years; the American League just
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MLS's discrimination is ostensibly rooted in citizenship status rather
than race, and because the American legal system permits myriad
forms of citizenship discrimination, MLS's discrimination has
attracted little attention and virtually no criticism. The absence of
criticism is, however, unfortunate.
This Article argues that the MLS Policy restricting the numbers
of international players on its teams' rosters does, in fact, perpetuate
unlawful racial discrimination. While the Policy does not facially
discriminate against prospective players on the basis of race, and while
its drafters may not have intended racial exclusion, the MLS Policy
disproportionately and negatively impacts players of colorparticularly blacks and Latinos. In that the MLS Policy serves to
racially exclude in violation of federal antidiscrimination law, it
demands scrutiny. This Article provides that scrutiny, examines the
implications the MLS Policy has for America's other premier
professional sports leagues, and ultimately argues that MLS should
abandon the Policy.
Part II of this Article explores the MLS Policy's roots and the
circumstances ostensibly motivating its adoption.
Part III examines similar discriminatory policies implemented by
other nations' soccer leagues and the ultimate legal invalidation of
those policies. It focuses principally on the European Court of
Justice's groundbreaking disposition of Union Royale Beige des
Societes de Football Association ASBL (URBSFA) v Jean-Marc
Bosman (the Bosman case), which rendered unlawful international
player restrictions in European nations' domestic soccer leagues.
Part IV considers the form a Bosman-style challenge to the MLS
Policy would take under American law and assesses such a challenge's
likelihood of success, concluding that the MLS Policy would likely
pass muster under both the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA) and the national origin discrimination provision
embedded in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).
Part V considers the MLS Policy's racially related consequences
and explores the Policy's vulnerability on racial discrimination
grounds. Specifically, Part V examines Title VIl's racial discriminaone every two years. Some clubs would just not add any... It took fourteen years
for the major leagues to become integrated ....
Id. at 5. Even once the leagues were fully "integrated," as Ashe uses the term, many
franchises have persisted in considering race in their personnel hiring processes so as to field
teams palatable to the franchises' fan bases. See generallyDuru, supra note 4 (discussing the
legal issues presented by race-considered roster constitution).
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tion provision and argues that the Policy constitutes either disparate
treatment or disparate impact racial discrimination in violation of
federal antidiscrimination law.
Part VI examines the MLS Policy in the context of premier
professional American sports, a context in which, as noted above, it
stands alone in its overt citizenship discrimination. Specifically, Part
VI considers the NFL, in which international players are exceedingly
rare; the NHL, in which international players predominate; and the
NBA, in which the percentage of international players increases yearover-year, noting that roster internationalization in these leagues'
contexts, in contrast with the MLS context, either maintains the
leagues' racial status quos or increases the proportion of the leagues'
white players. In addition, Part VI considers the possibility that these
differences in internationalization's impact explain why roster
internationalization is seemingly deemed more palatable in the NFL,
the NHL, and the NBA, where it is permitted, than in MILS, where it is
restricted.
Part VII explores the MLB context, in which internationalization
is producing the precise effect the MLS Policy guards against-a
"darkening" rather than a "lightening" of the league-and queries
whether, in response to internationalization's impact, MLB would or
could join MLS in overt citizenship discrimination.
Part VIII concludes that the MLS Policy, whether or not intended
to do so, artificially suppresses the numbers of MLS's players of color,
frustrates the purposes of American antidiscrimination law, and,
therefore, merits legal challenge.
II.

THE MLS POLICY AND ITS ORIGINS

MLS began play in 1996 as a fledgling league with teams in ten
cities around the nation.9 During its thirteen-year existence, the
League has significantly expanded and is now composed of fifteen
teams-fourteen in the United States and one in Toronto, Canada."
While MLS shares many characteristics with America's other
premier professional sports leagues, its commitment to discriminating

9.
See Alex Yannis, MajorLeague Soccer Gets Set for Unveilngs,N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
17, 1995, at B10.
10. Major League Soccer, General Overview, http://web.mlsnet.com/about/ (last
visited Sept. 15, 2009).
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along citizenship lines, as noted above, starkly differentiates it." MLS
categorizes players into two groups--domestic players and
international players." MLS defines a "domestic player" as "a U.S.
citizen, a permanent resident (green card holder) or the holder of other
special status (e.g., refugee or asylum status).'0 3 MLS defines all other
players as "international players.' 4 Since its inception, MLS has
restricted the number of international players on a team, but has placed
no similar restriction on domestic players' numbers.'5 Initially, MLS
prevented each of its teams from employing more than four
international players at any given time.'6 Currently, MLS mandates
that each team's twenty-person senior roster-the roster of players with
guaranteed contracts who are most likely to represent the team in
competition-contain no more than eight international players.
A.

The NASis Rise andFall

A brief historical exploration of American soccer is necessary to
understand the MLS Policy, its detriments, and MLS's purported
interests in effectuating it. The MLS Policy's origin is largely rooted in
the demise of the North American Soccer League (NASL). The
NASL operated from 1968 through 1984 and stands as the most
successful and longest lasting professional soccer league in American

11. Citizenship restrictions exist at the professional American minor league level as
well. United Soccer Leagues, Rules and Regulations, 2009 Season (2009), http://www.usl
soccer.com/aboutusl/rules/indexE.html.
12. 2009 MLS Player Rules & Regulations Summary, supm note 1.
13. Once MLS placed a team in Toronto, it defined "domestic player" differently in
that context: "For Toronto FC, players with the legal right to work in Canada are considered
domestic players." Id.
14. Id
15. See id
16. Alex Yannis, SoccerReport N.Y. TimES, July 16, 1996, at B 12.
17. In addition to its senior roster, each team is permitted a "developmental" roster of
players under twenty-five years old. These rosters, which number four players, are
unregulated as to citizenship status. Developmental players, however, are generally the team's
lowest paid players, sign nonguaranteed contracts, and can be waived at any time. 2009 MLS
Player Rules & Regulations Summary, supranote 1. They are clearly each team's second-tier
players and are unlikely to represent their clubs in MLS competition, rendering their
nondiscriminatory treatment minimally meaningful for purposes of this Article. See id
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history. Ultimately, however, it failed, hurdling from unprecedented
success to extinction in just a few years.'9
Commentators almost universally attribute the league's rapid
decline to its heavy international influence and the financial toll that
attracting high-caliber international players took on league teams."
And, almost universally, they identify the onset of the NASL
"spending race" with the New York Cosmos' decision in 1975 to sign
Pel6-the Brazilian soccer star still regarded as the best player in the
sport's history-to a then-unprecedented $4.5 million, three-year
contract.' Pel6's impact on the league was immediate as his presence
drastically increased the Cosmos' popularity." Pleased with Pel's
contribution, the Cosmos, during the following few years, continued to
stock its roster with star players from other countries. 3 To the extent
they could manage it financially, other teams followed suit."
The imported players lent the NASL credibility that it had not
previously enjoyed and sparked a substantial rise in attendance.
Whereas average league attendance per game before Pel6's arrival was
7,653 spectators, by 1977 it had nearly doubled to 14,640. While the
league-wide increase was substantial, the rise in attendance at Cosmos
home games was meteoric. Before the 1977 season, the team's
attendance record for a home game was 28,436.26 Early in the 1977
season, on June 5, they broke the attendance record with a home crowd
of 31,208. One week later, they broke the record again with a crowd
of 36,826, and a week after that, they shattered the record with 62,394
spectators. 8 In August of 1977, they set yet another attendance record,

18.
Wayne Douglas Rasmussen, Historical Analysis of Four Major Attempts To
Establish Professional Soccer in the United States of America Between 1894 and 1994, at 2747 (May 18, 1995) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Temple University) (on file with Samuel
L. Paley Library, Temple University).
19.

ROGER ALLAWAY ET AL., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN SOCCER HISTORY 203-

05 (2001).
20. Id.at 202.
21.
Id.at 229.
22. During the several home games before Pel6 joined the Cosmos, the team
averaged 7000 spectators, upon his addition, average attendance jumped to 16,000 fans, and
after his season-ending injury, attendance dropped back to an average 7000 spectators. Id at
200.
23. Id at 191-92.
24. Id at 229-30; see also Seth Lubove, Soccer Socialism,FORBES, Dec. 18, 1995, at
259, availableat 1995 WLNR 5637941.
25.
ALLAWAY ETAL., supranote 19, at 201.
26. Id
27. Id.
28. Id.

620

TULANE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 84:613

this time hosting 77,691 spectators.29 Many other NASL teams also
entertained huge crowds during 1977,30 and the NAS's popularity had
so increased that the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)
nationally televised a weekly NASL game.' With soccer spectatorship
on the rise throughout the country, NASL teams scrambled to sign
players who would attract fan interest and, consequently, "foreign
superstars were arriving by the planeload."32
Not long after that, however, the NASL's fortunes precipitously
collapsed. Within five years, all of the NASIs original teams had
folded and the NASL was reeling.3 Convinced that the predominance
of international players and the nature of the international superstars'
salaries caused the decline, the NASL sought to "Americanize" as
much as possible in hopes of saving the league.' Although league
rules already mandated that each team's roster contain at least six
Americans, the league took the further steps of limiting the number
of non-American players permitted in a game at any given time and
creating one team, called Team America, on which no foreign citizens
were permitted to play. 6 The rule alterations, however, did little to
revive the NASL, and prior to the start of the 1985 season, the league
disbanded.
Even a cursory examination of the NASL's ills and the
discriminatory actions it took in hopes of curing them reveals the
league's solution to be hopelessly overbroad. While the NASLs failure
lay in teams' exploding salary structures, and while many of the
league's highest earning players were noncitizens, it was their cost,
rather than their citizenship status, that doomed the league. Indeed, the
29. See Rasmussen, supm note 18, at 41.
30. Such crowds included "32,165 in Los Angeles, 45,888 in Minnesota, 32,605 in
St. Louis, 56,265 in Seattle, 45,288 in Tampa, 30,277 in Vancouver and 31,283 in
Washington." ALLAWAY ET AL., supm note 19, at 201.
31.
Id.at 202.
32. Idat201.
33. See id at 203 ("The indications that the NASL was losing ground became
unmistakable in 1982. Perhaps the worst was the fact that ABC did not renew its television
contract.").
34. See Daniel L. Ciccarelli, A Review of the Historical and Sociological
Perspectives Involved in the Acceptance of Soccer as a Professional Sport in the United
States 87-88 (Jan. 25, 1983) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Temple University) (on file with
Samuel Paley Library, Temple University).
35.

See KYLE ROTE, JR. & BASIL KANE, KYLE ROTE, JR.'S COMPLETE BOOK OF

SOCCER 114 (1978).
36. See Ciccarelli, supm note 34, at 125-26.
37. See MICHAEL L. LABLANC & RICHARD HENSHAW, THE WORLD
SOCCER 320 (1994).
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presence of international players had been indispensable to the
development of American soccer for nearly a century and but for an
interest in soccer spurred by international players, the NASL would not
have existed.
B.

American Soccer InternationalGrounding

America's first soccer league of note, the American Soccer
League (ASL), operated during the 1920s and early 1930s, with teams
located in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeastern United States.38
Although founded in 1921, the "heart of [the league's] tenure" began
in 1924 and ran through 1928."9 The defining characteristic of that
period, during which the ASL achieved its greatest success, was the
league's inclusion, beginning during the summer of 1924, of
substantial numbers of international players."0 As foreign players
entered the league, bringing with them a dynamic style of play seldom
seen before in the United States, the league's popularity and prosperity
expanded." More popular even than intra-league matches were
exhibition matches between ASL teams and teams that had traveled
from other nations to play. 2 The ASL experience reveals that
professional American soccer was, from the very beginning, rooted in
the international game. Rather than weakening the league, international players strengthened it.43 And indeed, the league's ultimate
demise was a result not of foreign players' predominance or salary
demands, but of the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great
Depression. As it happened, the ASUs teams were disproportionately
located in manufacturing towns, such as Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, and
Fall River, Massachusetts-towns whose economies were particularly
38. The level of play in the ASL was exceptional by any standard. Indeed, "Several
eminent soccer historians concur that some of the best soccer in the world was regularly
played in the United States at the time, primarily in the ASL...." ANDREI S. MARKOVITS &
STEVEN L. HELLERMAN, OFFSIDE: SOCCERANDAMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 111 (2001).
39. ALLAWAY ETAL., spanote 19, at 8.
40. See id at 9-10.
41. A May 1, 1926 match between the all-Jewish Viennese Hakoah club and a
combination of players from the Indiana Flooring and the New York Giants teams drew a
crowd of 46,000 spectators, a record that stood until Pelt's career in the NASL. See
MARKOVITS & HELLERMAN, supra note 38, at 111; see alsoALLAWAY ET AL., supra note 19, at
10.
42. SecALLAWAY ETAL., supra note 19, at 10.
43. Like some of the NASs foreign players, the ASUs international stars
commanded high salaries and the cost of employing those players seemed to pay off as "stars
chose to immigrate to the United States as the pay was every bit as good, if not better, than
other professional leagues around the world." Rasmussen, supra note 18, at 20; see also
ALLAWAY ET AL., supranote 19, at 10.
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ravaged during the depression and rendered incapable of supporting
professional
soccer teams." Within a few years of the crash, the ASL
45
folded.
For decades, no American soccer league would achieve the
prominence of the ASL, but when one finally did achieve such
prominence, it did so as the ASL had, through the use of international
players. The International Soccer League (ISL), founded in 1960 and
existent through 1965, was American in the sense that the league
staged its games on American soil. Nevertheless, it was distinctly nonAmerican in that the league consisted of between ten and sixteen
teams of international players based in other nations-but playing in
the ISL during their home leagues' off-seasons-and only one team of
American players.16 Despite the ISUs scarcity of American players, the
league sparked considerable interest, and crowds of over 10,000
spectators-quite large in the American soccer context at the timeroutinely attended games."
By 1966, when soccer's global governing body-F6&dration
Internationalede FootballAssociation (FIFA)-prepared to stage its
quadrennial soccer tournament pitting the world's top national teams
against each other, American interest in soccer, sparked largely by the
48
ISUs success and popularity, had risen to an unprecedented level.
American fans so desired seeing the tournament's final game between
England and West Germany" that the National Broadcasting
Corporation (NBC) contracted to broadcast it live across North
America."° Reaction to the broadcast was overwhelmingly positive,
prompting a scramble among United States soccer promoters to
capitalize on Americans' increasing interest in soccer through creation
of new professional soccer leagues." Thus during the following year,
two rival professional soccer leagues began play in the United States:

44. SeeCiccarelli, supm note 34, at 52-55.
45. The date of the ASIis folding is unclear. ALLAWAY ET AL., supm note 19, at 10
("Exactly when the league came to an end is difficult to pinpoint, because it folded somewhat
in stages, making the end either 1931, 1932 or 1933, depending on which stage in its demise
is considered the real end.").
46. See RICHARD HENSHAW, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SOCCER 372-73 (1979).
47. See MARKOVITS & HELLERMAN, supranote 38, at 119.
48. SeeROrE&KANE, supm note 35, at 88.
49. In 1949, Germany was divided into two states, East Germany and West Germany.
The country unified in 1990. See Robert M. Berdahl, German Reunification in Historical
Perspective,23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 496, 499 (2005).
50. See Lawrence Casey, SportsLedger,CI. DAILY DEFENDER, Aug. 2, 1966, at 25.
51.
See Rasmussen, supranote 18, at27-28.
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the United Soccer Association (USA) and the National Professional
Soccer League (NPSL)"
The USA adopted, but altered, the ISs model of professional
American soccer. Like the ISL, the USA imported entire teams from
other nations to compete in the United States. 3 Unlike the ISL,
however, the USA affiliated each of the twelve imported teams with an
American city.' So, during the two-month-long USA season, for
example, Italy's Cagliari soccer club represented Chicago and Ireland's
Glentoran Belfast soccer club represented Detroit.5 The NPSL took a
more traditional approach to league creation, recruiting players to play
for newly formed NPSL teams. 6

Each league held a substantial advantage over the other. FIFA
publicly supported the USA, giving the league instant credibility, and,
in fact, FIFA went so far as to outlaw the NPSL and threaten the
league's players with suspension from international competition."
While the NPSL lacked the FIFA support the USA enjoyed, the NPSL
managed to establish a television contract with the Columbia
Broadcasting System (CBS), which created a potential revenue stream
to which the USA had no access.
Neither league, however, succeeded in its inaugural year, and in
the following year, 1968, the leagues merged to form the NASL.5 9
Standing on the shoulders of the ASL, the ISL, and USA-all of
which included, and benefited from, international players-and born
of the enthusiasm the 1966 FIFA World Cup engendered among
American soccer fans, the NASL was indubitably deeply rooted in the
international game. And indeed, as noted above, the NASL achieved
its greatest successes due to noncitizen players' participation.
So, while a pursuit of high-priced international players ultimately
seemed to damage the NASL, an international presence did not.
52. Id at 29-30; MARKOVIrs & HELLERMAN, supra note 38, at 164-65.
53. LABLANC & HENSHAW, supra note 37, at 314-16.
54.
Id at 315-16.
55. Id at 316.
56.
See Deane McGowen, Plans for Nationwide ll-Team Pro Soccer League
FormulatedHere, N.Y. TimEs, May 11, 1966, at 83.
57.

SeeALLAWAY ETAL., supra note 19, at 197-98.

58.
Seeid.at 198.
59.
In 1967, the NPSL filed an $18 million lawsuit for restraint of trade against FIFA,
the United States Soccer Football Association, and the USA, but "[b]y the end of [the first]
season, both leagues had run up huge financial losses, made little, if any, impact on the
American sports public, and ... decided to merge for the 1968 season after the NPSL agreed
to drop its lawsuit against the USA and its organizational allies." MARKovrrs & HELLERmAN,

supm note 38, at 165.
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Indeed, the histories of American soccer generally, and of the NASL in
particular, provide no reason to believe that international players who
were not exorbitantly remunerated were detrimental to the league's
success. Rather, excessively high salaries, to whomever they may have
been granted, precipitated the NASLs demise. Consistently regulated
salary structures, rather than citizenship discrimination, therefore,
could seemingly have been its salvation.' The NASL, however, opted
for discrimination, and years later, the MLS, justifying discrimination
as necessary to the league's survival, did the same.
III.

THE EUROPEAN LESSON

While the MLS Policy is unique on the American sporting
landscape, such policies have long prevailed elsewhere in the world.6
Although a rarity at home, the Policy, once conceived, found
grounding in the global soccer community context. That context,
however, began shifting in recent decades, and on the eve of the MLS's
founding, it shifted mightily. A Belgian soccer player named JeanMarc Bosman successfully challenged nationality restrictions imposed
by the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)-the body
charged with governing soccer on the European continent-which is
home to the world's most prestigious and competitive soccer leagues."
The Bosman decision reverberated throughout the soccer world and, as
discussed below, must certainly have spurred MILS to analyze how
such a challenge might fare under American law.
A.

PresagingBosman:A Movement TowardInclusion

As early as the 1960s, European nations' soccer leagues began
imposing rules restricting the use of noncitizen players.63 Different
nations' rules have taken different forms, with some restricting the
numbers of noncitizen players a club could employ and others placing

60. The NASL attempted to implement a salary cap in its final year of existence, but
the league's financial woes were, by then, beyond remedy. Clive Gammon, The NASL: Itl
Alive But on Death Row, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 7, 1984, at 74.
61. See Martin J. Greenberg & James T Gray, CitizenshipBased Quota Systems in
Athletics, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 337, 340-41 (1996).
62. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Beige des Socit6s de FootballAss'n ASBL v
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, para. 129.
63. Id.para. 25 (Judgment of the Court).
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no restrictions on employment but limiting the number of noncitizens
permitted to play during any one game.'
Beginning in 1978, however, UEFA sought to regulate, though
not eliminate, the nationality discrimination prevailing throughout
European soccer. Among the European Union's member states,65
UEFA moved to prohibit "limitations on the number of contracts
entered into by each club" with citizens of other nations, but chose not
to prohibit restrictions on the number of noncitizen players permitted
to participate in any particular match.66 Instead, UEFA set a floor on
the latter form of discrimination-requiring that no league rule limit
the number of noncitizen players appearing in a game to fewer than
67

two.

Just over a decade later, UEFA further narrowed the scope of
permissible discrimination through its "three + two rule."' 8 With this
rule, UEFA decreed leagues could not require that teams restrict the
numbers of noncitizen players on their lists of players eligible to play
in a particular game (Team Sheets) to fewer than three.69 The rule also
mandated that leagues let teams place on their Team Sheets two
additional noncitizens, provided those noncitizens had played in the
country in question uninterruptedly for five years." Leagues were, of
course, allowed to permit teams to play more noncitizens than the five
described, but not fewer.7' So, while the rule expanded opportunities
for noncitizen players in Europe, it stopped short of eliminating
nationality discrimination.

64.

Jesse Gary, Note, The Demise ofSport? The Effect of JudiciallyMandatedFree

Agency on European Football and American Baseball, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 293, 298

(2005).
65. Twenty-seven of Europe's forty-eight nations are members of the European
Union. EUROPA, Member States of the EU, http://europa.eu/abc/european-countries/eu_
members/indexen.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
66. See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921 para. 26 (Judgment of the Court).
67.
Amikam Omer Kranz, The Bosman Case: The RelationshipBetween European
Union Law and the Transfer System in European Football, 5 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 431, 435
(1999).
68.
Rachel B. Arnedt, Comment, European Union Law and Football Nationality
Restrictions: The Economics and Politicsof the Bosman Decision, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REv.
1091, 1104 (1998).
69.
Id.
70. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921 para. 38 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
71.
Scotland's premier professional soccer league, for instance, places no cap on
noncitizen players. Id.para. 40.
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In 1995, four years after UEFA implemented the "three + two
rule," the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ)7 took
the opportunity to assess the legality of such discrimination in deciding
the Bosman case.73 And despite nationality restrictions' longevity and
wide-ranging acceptance, the court found them unlawful.
B.

TheBosman Case

Beginning in 1986, Jean-Marc Bosman played for the Belgian
soccer club RC Liege, under a five-year contract." As the contract
term neared its end, RC Liege offered to extend Bosman's contract for
one year if he accepted a salary reduction. Bosman refused the offer
and managed to obtain a contract from a different team, US
Dunkerque, based in France rather than Belgium." Under UEFA rules,
a player who leaves a team upon contract expiration is only permitted
to join another team if the latter team pays the former a transfer fee."
Although US Dunkerque and RC Liege initially agreed upon transfer
compensation, RC Liege, anticipating US Dunkerque's impending
insolvency, essentially voided the deal by failing to request that
Belgian soccer's governing body, URBSFA, send the French Football
Association a certificate clearing the transaction. "
Rendered
unemployed, Bosman sued RC Liege, URBSFA, and UEFA,"
challenging the transfer fee requirement under article 48 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community (the Treaty of
Rome), which regards freedom of movement among workers.' In
72. The ECJ's decisions are binding throughout the European Union (EU) and its
mandate is to ensure "that EU law is interpreted and applied uniformly throughout the
member states." Arnedt, supranote 68, at 1095.
73. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921 para. 132 (Opinion ofAdvocate General Lenz).
74. Id.para. 135.
75. Id.
para. 42; Arnedt, supra note 68, at 1105.
76. See Stephan Weatherhill, Case C-415/93, Union Royale Beige des Soci~t~s de
Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman; Royal Club Li~geois SA v. Jean-Marc
Bosman, SA d'Economie Mixte Sportive de l'Union Sportive du Littoral de Dunkerque,
Union Royale Beige des Soci&ths de Football Association ASBL, Union des Associations
Europ~ennes de Football; Union des Associations Europennes de Football v. Jean-Marc
Bosman. Article 177Reference by Cour d'Appel,Liege, on the InterpretationofArticles 48,
85 and 86 EC Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 15 December 1995, 33
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 991,996 (1996).

77. Id
78. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921 para. 9 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
79. Id.para. 33 (Judgment of the Court).
80. UEFA was not listed as a defendant in the initial complaint, but was later added.
Id para. 39.
81.
Amedt, supranote 68, at 1106.
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addition, Bosman argued that article 48 rendered unlawful the UEFA
rules permitting leagues to impose nationality restrictions.
Although UEFA asserted that no nationality restriction ever
hindered Bosman's career and that his argument bearing on such
restrictions was, therefore, not appropriately before the court, the court
felt otherwise.83 Noting that nationality restrictions "are the foundation
of the rules of the various European football associations which reduce
[Bosman's] chances of finding employment in other [European Union]
Member States," the court found the claim admissible.' Moreover, the
court ruled the nationality restrictions unlawful.
Sharply rejecting the restrictions, the court declared, "No deep
cogitation is required to reach the conclusion that the rules on foreign
players are of a discriminatory nature. They represent an absolutely
classic case of discrimination ....The rules on foreign players are
therefore incompatible with the prohibition of discrimination under
Article 48 ... , The court acknowledged that restrictions on
numbers of noncitizen players permitted to play in a game were less
burdensome than restrictions on numbers of noncitizen players
permitted under contract, but the court nonetheless found restrictions
of both sorts inconsistent with article 48." Under threat of substantial
economic damages, UEFA complied with the court's decision and
abandoned its policy permitting nationality discrimination."
So, although nationality restrictions endured in European soccer
for decades, they could not endure direct legal challenge. And in the
end, the question was not a close one. In ultimately dispatching the
defendants' argument, the court explained "[t]he rules on foreign
players breach [antidiscrimination] principles in such a blatant and
serious manner that any reference to national interests ... must be
regarded as inadmissible as against those principles."'
82. David W Penn, Note, From Bosman to Simutenkov The Application of NonDiscriminationPrinciplesto Non-EUNationalsin EuropeanSports, 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REv. 203, 212 (2006).
83. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921 para. 63-67 (Judgment of the Court).
84. Id.
para.67 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
85. Id.
para. 135.
86. Id.
para. 136.
87. SeeArnedt, supra note 68, at 1107.
88. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921 para. 142 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
The Bosman decision, which prompted some teams to substantially increase their numbers of
foreign players, sparked controversy and resistance. Penn, supra note 82, at 226-30 (detailing
"[o]ngoing [a]ttempts to [f]rustrate Bosman's [a]nti-[d]iscriniination [p]rinciples"); Lindsey
Valaine Briggs, Comment, UEFA v The European Communiy,: Attempts of the Governing
Body of EuropeanSoccer To CircumventEUFreedom ofMovement andAntidscrimination
Labor Law, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 439, 440-41 (2005). Over a decade later, influential members
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BOSMAl S STATESIDE RELEVANCE: ASSESSING THE MERITS OF A
BOSMAALSTYLE CHALLENGE TO THE MLS POLICY

The Bosman decision was groundbreaking. In its wake, MLS
organizers must certainly have analyzed their prospective league's
potential exposure under American law. Any such analysis would have
centered then, as it would today, on two statutes: Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) and the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). These statutes, and their applicability to
MLS international player restrictions, are addressed in turn.
A.

Title VII, Espinoza, and the MLS Policy

Title VII operates as this nation's most significant employment
discrimination statute. 9 The statute reads, in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.9 °
Title VII's prohibition applies to both private and public employers
with fifteen or more employees,9' which means the prohibition applies
to American professional sports organizations' employment practices.92
Title VII applies to the MLS Policy, and the nature of the Policy's
exclusion seemingly invites a national origin discrimination claim. 3
of the European soccer community continue to actively campaign against the Bosman
decision and to lament its impact. See, e.g., Soccer Roundup, BritishMinisterFavors Quotas
on ForeignPlayers,NYTIMES.COM, July 27, 2008, http:www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/sports/
soccer/27soccer.html.
89. Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty. A Brief Look at the Bith, Death, and
Resurrection ofthe DisparateImpact Theory ofDiscrimination,22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
431, 432-33 (2005).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006).
91.
Seeid.§ 2000e(b).
92. MLS is notably unique among such organizations. Whereas America's other
premier sports leagues serve as umbrella organizations for the leagues' various teams, MLS
operates as a single entity. The league owns the rights to all of the league's players, owns all
of the league's teams, and provides for the allocation of the various players among the
different teams. As a single entity, MLS is immune to charges that it seeks to restrain trade
through conspiracy. Its single entity status, however, increases its exposure to employment
discrimination charges, as it is the direct employer of all the league's players. See Fraser v.
Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 E3d 47, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2002).
93. It bears noting that Title VII's protections extend beyond citizens to "any
individual[s]" who suffer discriminatorily unlawful adverse employment actions. As such, an
international player's noncitizen status will not impede his Title VII challenge. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). Indeed, many courts hold that even undocumented noncitizens can assert
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An analysis of what "national origin" discrimination encompasses,
however, reveals the difficulty any such charge would face.
Title VII does not clearly define the term "national origin."" The
omission, of course, gave the courts the opportunity to read into
"national origin" what they felt appropriate, and the consequence was
a rather narrow definition. After substantial debate in the lower courts
as to the meaning of "national origin," the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue in 1973 when deciding Espinoza v Farah
Manufacturing Co." In that case, Farah Manufacturing Company,
pursuant to its policy against hiring non-U.S. citizens, rejected Cecilia
Espinoza's application for employment with the company as a
seamstress. "6 Although Espinoza was a Mexican citizen, she was, at
the time of her rejection, lawfully residing in the United States."
Espinoza interpreted Farah Manufacturing's hiring policy as
privileging individuals of American national origin over individuals of
Mexican national origin and, thus, violating Title VIl's prohibition
against national origin discrimination.
Espinoza prevailed before the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas, which found that Farah Manufacturing's
refusal to employ non-U.S. citizens amounted to national origin
discrimination under the statute." The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, however, reversed, and the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the reversal.'" Both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme
Court refused to apply Title VII as Espinoza urged.
A key factor in the Supreme Court's ultimate disposition was a
distinction between national origin and citizenship."° ' Recognizing that
Congress, in crafting Title VII, failed to define the term "national
origin,' the Court turned, for insight, to various portions of the Act's
legislative history, ultimately concluding that the Act's prohibition on
Title VII claims. See David Weissbrodt, Remedies for Undocumented Noncitizens in the
Workplace: UsingInternationalLawto Narrow the HoldingofHoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc. v. NLRB, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1424, 1426-30 (2008) (detailing the United States Supreme
Court's Hoffman Plastic ruling, limiting undocumented noncitizens' ability to challenge
adverse employment actions under the National Labor Relations Act, and explaining that a
plurality of courts refuse to expand the case's holding into the Title VII realm).
94. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 89 (1973).
95. Espinoza,414 U.S. 86.
96. Id.at 87.
97. Id
98. See id. at 95.
99. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 343 E Supp. 1205, 1207-08 (WD. Tex. 1971).
100. Espinoza,414 U.S. at 88.
101. Id.at 95.
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national origin discrimination does not "make[] it illegal to
discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage."' 2 Espinoza
therefore teaches that among U.S. citizens, employers may not
discriminate against persons because of their national origins, but that
employers may lawfully discriminate against non-U.S. citizens,
whatever their national origins, simply because they are not U.S.
citizens. MLS's citizenship discrimination, therefore, would seem to
pass muster under Espinoza It does not disadvantage U.S. citizens of
any particular national origin. Rather, it disadvantages noncitizens vis,-ids citizens, which is precisely what the Espinoza Court deemed
lawful.
B.

IRCA andthe MLS Policy

IRCA's protections, however, reach beyond Title VII's national
origin discrimination prohibition to protect individuals Espinozaleaves
vulnerable.' 3 Congress enacted IRCA primarily to prohibit the
employment of unauthorized aliens, but included in IRCA an
antidiscrimination provision, which created an unprecedented cause of
action for persons seeking to challenge employment-based citizenship
discrimination.'" Under the statute, it is unlawful to discriminate in the
hiring or recruitment of, or to discriminatorily discharge, any non-U.S.
citizen who is a permanent U.S. resident, an asylee or a refugee.' 5
IRCA's antidiscrimination provision received its first significant test in
1987, less than a year after its enactment.
During the previous year, Zeki Yeni Komsu, a Turkish citizen and
a permanent resident of the United States, applied to be a pilot with
Mesa Airlines.'" The airline, however, rejected Komsu's application
pursuant to its policy of hiring only U.S. citizens unless such citizens
were unavailable for hire.' 7 Upon learning of Mesa Airlines' decision
102. Id. at 94-95.
103. Whereas Title VII applies only to entities with fifteen or more employees, IRCA
protects employees of entities with three or more employees, and thus protects a segment of
the workforce Title VII does not protect. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2) (2006).
104. See Daniel H. Tabak, Friendship Treaties and Disciminatory Practices, 28
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 475, 483-86 (1995).

105. These protected individuals maintain their protection as long as they pursue
naturalization within a specified period after qualifying for naturalization. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324b(a)(3).
106. United States v. Mesa Airlines, I OCAHO 74,6-7 (1989).

107. Eric Trigg, Mesa's director of operations, stated the corporation's policy was "to
hire only U.S. citizens if a sufficient number of qualified citizens [were] available to fill the
positions needed." Id at 33 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mesa's general counsel
elaborated on the corporation's hiring practices, noting that Mesa first "remove[s] all resumes
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and the policy underlying it, Komsu filed a citizenship discrimination
action with the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Special Counsel
(OSC), the administrative body responsible for fielding IRCA
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)hearing the Komsu
claims.'
case found that Mesa's policy flatly violated IRCA's antidiscrimination
mandate. 10

While Title VII's national origin prohibition provision poses little
threat to a regime of citizenship discrimination, IRCA potentially
poses a substantial threat, which MLS organizers may well have
recognized. To comport with IRCA, MLS could not have flatly
privileged citizens over noncitizens, but rather required a more
nuanced form of discrimination, which is what the Policy provides.
Closely tracking IRCA's language, the Policy, as noted in Part II,
privileges a player who is a U.S. citizen or "a permanent resident
(green card holder) or the holder of other special status (e.g., refugee
or asylum status)."" ° The Policy seems, therefore, to permit
discrimination only to the extent IRCA does, and thus to avoid IRCA
liability. Through craffing the Policy as it did, MLS has averted
UEFA's fate.
So, while Bosman successfully challenged nationality restrictions
in Europe, there appeared little threat, as MLS began operations, that a
Bosman analogue in the United States could have similar success in
challenging the Policy. Indeed, the Bosman decision, through
highlighting the possibility of legal challenge, may have increased
MLS organizers' vigilance in crafting the Policy to comport with
applicable American law. Ultimately, in MLS's fourteen-year
existence, the Policy has endured no substantial challenge.
V

THE CASE FORA RACE CLAIM

A searching examination of the MLS Policy and its consequences, however, reveals the Policy has spawned an additional
societal cost: racial discrimination. Whatever one's view of the MLS
Policy and MLS's intention in enacting it, the Policy serves to limit,

of pilots who do not have sufficient time according to Mesa's minimum standards to be
considered as a pilot" and, second, "[olnce determin[ed] that the number of qualified U.S.
citizens[] exceeds the number of job openings, the Company will remove the non-citizens[']
at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
resumes from the stack." Id.
at 13.
108. Id.
109. Id at 52.
110. 2009 MLS Players Rules & Regulations Summary, supm note 1.
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numerically, the league's players of color. Indeed, the percentage of
MLS's players of color has never risen above forty-two percent."'
If MLS did not cap the number of international players permitted
on its teams, however, the league's complexion would likely be quite
different. The international players who join MLS hail primarily from
Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, and are, unsurprisingly,
largely of color."' The league's domestic players are, in contrast,
largely white.' While domestic players can compete for all of MLS's
roster positions, international players must compete among themselves
for a subset of those positions."4 In essence, then, the MLS Policy sets
a higher bar for these international players, the majority of whom are
of color, than it sets for domestic players, the majority of whom are
white.
So, while the Policy may be invulnerable to IRCA challenge and
Title VII national origin challenge, this demographic consequence
suggests the Policy may be vulnerable to Title VII challenge under race
analysis. Such vulnerability exists regardless of MLS's intent, as
employers are potentially liable for both intentional discrimination
(disparate treatment) and unintentional discrimination (disparate
impact). Discussion of these two Title VII theories and their potential
application in the MLS context follows.
A.

The MLS Policyas DisparateTreatmentDiscriminaion

While there exists no dispositive evidence of discriminatory
intent, it is certainly possible that MLS desired a predominantly white
league and believed the Policy to be a lawful means of attaining that
outcome. To assume MLS desired a predominantly white league is, of
course, not necessarily to assume the League's decision makers were
perniciously racist. Indeed, from the beginning, MLS has actively
reached out to Latino fans."' However, perhaps recognizing that the
111. See RICHARD LAPCHICK, DEVOS SPORT Bus. MGMT. PROGRAM, THE 2008 RACIAL
AND GENDER REPORT CARD: MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER 12 (2008), http://web.bus.ucf edu/

documents/sport/2008 racial-and gender-report-cardmajor-league-soccer.pdf.
112. Major League Soccer, http://www.mlsnet.com/players/ (last visited Sept. 16,
2009).
113. Id
114. 2009 MLS Player Rules & Regulations Summary, supra note 1.
115. See Milt Northrop, Soccer League Gets Fast Start at the Gate, BUFFALO NEWS,
June 15, 1996, at BI ("MLS is directing a lot of its marketing at the nation's Spanishspeaking population."). MLS has continued, since its founding, to seek a stronger connection
with the Latino community. By 2003, nine of the league's then ten teams broadcast their
games in Spanish on both radio and television, and the League had begun sponsoring a fouron-four soccer tournament called Futbolito, which it held in ten cities around the nation and
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majority of its league-wide fan base would be white, ' 6 MLS may have
made a calculated business decision that the fledgling league would
most easily attain success if the majority of its players were white.
Such a decision would not have been unprecedented or, necessarily,
irrational.
1.

The Economic Incentive To Discriminate

Consider, for example, the NBA's Boston Celtics' organizational
history. The Celtics were the first team in the NBA to employ a black
player,1 7 to put an entirely black team on the court at the same time,"8
and to hire a black coach."9 Still, some twenty years after
accomplishing these milestones, at a time when almost seventy-five
percent of the league's players were black,'20 "the Celtics were
conspicuous as the NBA team employing fewer black players than any
other."' 2 ' In fact, during the 1985-86 and 1986-87 seasons, "the
Celtics'[] twelve-man roster consisted of four black players and eight
white players and stood in sharp contrast with the composition of the
league. "' The team's composition was no accident. Noting the
Celtics' disproportionately high number of white players, University of
Massachusetts Sociologist Wornie Reed launched a statistical analysis
of the disproportionality during the 1986-87 season and concluded the
which, it marketed directly to Latino fans. Jack Bell, MLS. Woos Hispanic Fans to the
Game TheyLove, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, § 8, at 9. Further, in 2007, MLS created a Latin
American Advisory Board, which according to an MLS press release, consists of "a diverse
cross-section of individuals from the Latin American community committed to the growth of
MLS and the sport in the United States [and] which represents MLS' continued dedication to
the Latin American community." Major League Soccer, Major League Soccer Unveils Latin
American Advisory Board (July 17, 2007), http://web.mlsnet.com/news/mls-news.jsp?ymd=
20070717&contentid=106089.
116. Although MLS had a "potentially huge base of Latin-American fans," LatinAmericans comprised only a minority of MLS's spectators. Paul Gardner, Lat'n American
Flair Will Boost AiLS Popularity,N.Y. SUN, Sept. 11, 2007, at Sports 17 (emphasis added).
In 1998, two years after MLS's inception, Latin Americans comprised twenty-five percent of
the league's spectators, see David Plotz, Major League Soccer: Ameicas Un-American
Sports League, SLATE, Mar. 29, 1998, http://www.slate.com/id/1858, and while that number
for years steadily grew at a rate of roughly one percent per year, see Bell, supra note 115, § 8,
at 9 (noting that during the 2002 season, thirty percent of MLS spectators were Latin
American), many Latin Americans continue to view the MLS skeptically. Gardner, supia at
17.
117. ARATON & BONDY, supra note 6, at 50-51; BRYANT, supranote 6, at 143.
118. ARATON & BONDY, supm note 6, at 58; see also BRYANT, supra note 6, at 143.
119. ARATON & BONDY, supm note 6, at 51; BRYANT, supranote 6, at 143.
120. SeeARATON & BONDY, supra note 6, at 122.
121. Duru, supranote 4, at 395 (citing BRYANT, supm note 6, at 143-44).
122. Id.at 395-96.
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Celtics intentionally considered race in crafting the team's roster.23' So
dedicated were the Celtics to this race-considered roster construction,
that disproportionate whiteness became central to the organization's
identity. Indeed, even years after the Celtics abandoned such blatant
discriminatory hiring practices, "the Celtics are synonymous with
whiteness," writes Washington Post and ESPN journalist Michael
Wilbon.'2'
While Reed did not proceed to explore the reasons underlying the
Celtics' long-standing discriminatory player personnel hiring practices,
the Celtics' historical development as an economic enterprise reveals
the team's motivation-they did it to please the fans and, therefore, to
maximize fan-generated profits.' The Celtics' transformation from
equal opportunity pioneer to stark racial disproportionality was
spurred
by professional basketball's, and thus the Celtics', evolution during the
1970s from a little known entertainment source into a substantial
economic enterprise reliant on attracting a fan-base to pay admission
and fill arena seats. Attracting fans in racially polarized Boston, and
thus ensuring economic viability, demanded a largely white team.'26
Jo Jo White, a Celtic for several years during the 1980s, explains that
Boston simply "wouldn't support a majority black team, even if it were
successful." In creating an overwhelmingly white team, Celtics'
management was "merely responding to the will of the people."' 27'
Former Celtics co-owner Alan Cohen expressed the same sentiment in
more veiled terms, indicating the importance in the overwhelmingly
black NBA of"hav[ing] some balance on the team, in terms of race."' 28'
While the Celtics' consideration of race in constructing their
roster was particularly obvious, it was certainly not anomalous.
Consider former Cleveland Cavaliers owner Ted Stepien's view on
considering race in crafting his team's roster: "[Hf]alf the squad should
be white. I think people are afraid to speak out on that subject. White
123. See Gregory Witcher & Jonathan Kaufman, Blacks Split on Backing the Celtics
BOSTON GLOBE, June 4, 1987, at Metro 1.
124. Michael Wilbon, A PerceptibleChange,WASH. PosT, June 5,2008, at El. In light

of this organizational identity, Wilbon writes, the Celtics were inescapably conspicuous as
they appeared in the 2008 NBA Championship with an almost exclusively black team. Id In
fact, the Celtics' transition away from devoted race-considered roster construction began
during the 1990s under then-General Manager Dave Gavitt's leadership. See ARATON &
BONDY, supm note 6, at 243-48.
125. ARATON& BONDY, supranote 6, at 58.
126. Duru, supra note 4, at 396.
127.

BRYANT, supm note 6, at 144; see alsoARATON & BONDY, supra note 6, at 58.

128. ARATON& BONDY, supranote 6, at 58.
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people have to have white heroes. I'll be truthful, I respect them
[blacks], but I need white people. It's in me."'29 Utah Jazz leadership

may maintain a similar perspective. In fact, in each season since 1990,
"the percentage of white players on the Utah Jazz's roster has
outstripped the percentage of white players in the league." '

Such race consideration might initially appear aberrant, but it is
not. In a groundbreaking 1991 American Journalof Economics &
Sociology study-a study published just a few short years after the
Celtics fielded their grossly disproportionate teams and only a few
years before MLS's founding-scholars Eleanor Brown, Diane
Keenan, and Richard Spiro examined the preferences of NBA fans.

Though not the first such study,3 ' it was, perhaps, the most thorough
and damning, bluntly concluding that "white fans have a taste for

seeing white players."'' 2 This customer discrimination seemingly
motivated clubs' personnel decisions across the NBA."'
129.
130.

Id.at 181.
Duru, supra note 4, at 400 (citing

2004 RACIAL AND
http://web.bus.ucf.
edu/documents/sport/2004_racial-genderreport card nba.pdf; JAZZ, All-Time Roster,
http://www.nba.com/jazz/history/history.roster_ah.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2009);
Basketball Statistics Archive, Players Index, http://www.basket-stats.info/players/abc/f.htm
(last visited Sept. 19, 2009). Notably, Dr. Lapchick did not compile statistics for the 2002-03
NBA season.
131. See, e.g., James V Koch & C. Warren Vander Hill, Is There Discriminationin the
'BlackMan Game', 6 SoC. SCi. Q. 83 (1988); Jerome Karabel & David Karen, Color on
the Cout 4 INTHESE TIMES, Feb. 10-16 (1982), at 23, 23-24; Daniel R. Vining & James F.
Kerrigan, An Application of the Lexis Ratio to the Detection ofRacial Quotasin Professional
Sports." A Note, 22 AM. ECON. 71 (1987); Joseph M. Markmann, A Note on Discrimination
by Race in ProfessionalBasketball,20 AM. ECON. 65 (1976).
Other studies, focusing primarily on what their authors concluded to be a reduced or
eliminated racial salary gap in the NBA, asserted the cessation of notable customer
discrimination in that league. See, e.g., Frank A. Scott, James E. Long & Ken Somppi,
Salary vs. MaiginalRevenue Product Under Monopsony and Competition--The Case of
ProfessionalBasketball, 13 ATL. ECON. J. 50 (1985); Charles E. Rockwood & Ephraim Asher,
RacialDiscriminationin ProfessionalBasketballRevisited20 AM. ECON. 59 (1976).
132. Eleanor Brown, Richard Spiro & Diane Keenan, Wage and Nonwage
Discriminationin ProfessionalBasketball. Do Fans Affect It, 50 AM. J.OF ECON. & SOC.
333, 343 (1991).
133. In a league dominated by black players, race-considered roster construction in the
NBA often saw expression among the rarely utilized players. Recognizing that fans seeking
to see white players were indifferent as to whether those players actually participated
meaningfully in games, Brown et al., supra note 132, at 339-40, NBA teams seemingly
sought to maintain a "white" presence on their teams without sacrificing competitiveness
through filling their final several roster spots---the spots allocated to reservesdisproportionately with white players. Indeed, "[wlhile, in 1991, 72.4% of the league's
players were black and 27.6% were white, of the [seldom used reserves], only 47.4% were
black and 52.6% were white." Duru, supra note 4, at 397 (citing ARATON & BONDY, supra
note 6, at 124). Again, the trend was most noticeable with regard to the Celtics:
RiCHARD LAPCHICK, THE
GENDER REPORT CARD: NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 17 (2004),
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Although, as time passed, some researchers questioned the
continued existence of race-considered roster construction,'34 a 2002
Journal of Sports Economics study, reflecting on the 1991 American
Journalof Economics & Sociology study, revealed that still, after the
century's turn, "[NBA] teams are responding to customer discrimination.'" 5 As acclaimed New York Times sports columnist Bill Rhoden
expressed in his 2007 book, Forty Million Dollar Slaves. The Rise,
Fall,andRedemption of the BlackAthlete, "the NBA actively grooms
as many non-black players as it can."'' 6 Although perhaps glaring in
the NBA, the phenomenon is not restricted to that league, as revealed
by a 2001 Texas HspanicJournalofLaw andPolicystudy concluding
that, like the market for NBA players, "the market for MLB players is
characterized by customer discrimination.""'
It is conceivable then that-perceiving the customer
discrimination seemingly existent in American sport and thus
potentially existent among MLS's prospective fans, and desperate to
launch a successful league-the MLS brain trust intended to limit the
With the exception of Artis Gilmore for forty-seven games in 1988, the Celtics'
backup center position to Robert Parish was virtually a closed white union shop,
passed down from Rick Robey to Eric Fermsten to Greg Kite to Bill Walton to
Mark Acres to Brad Lohaus to Joe Kleine. If a fading white veteran such as
Walton, Pete Maravich, Scott Wedman, or Jim Paxson was available, the Celtics
could be counted on to make room.
ARATON & BONDY, supranote 6, at 122. And, as one Boston sportswriter, explains, the trend
was no secret: "It's been a running joke for years: white plus height equals a job with the
Boston Celtics. The white guy will always find a home in a Boston jersey. If it wasn't Jerry
Sichting, it was Scott Wedman, or Greg Kite, Mark Acres, Jim Paxson, or Fred Roberts."
BRYANT, supa note 6, at 144.
134. See, e.g., Paul T Schollaert & Donald H. Smith, Team Racial Compensationand
SportsAttendance,28 SOc. Q. 71 (1987).
135. Richard C.K. Burdekin, Richard T. Hossfeld & Janet Kilholm Smith, Are NBA
Fans Becoming Indifferent to Race? Evidence from the 1990s, 6 J. OF SPORTS ECON. 144,
147-48 (2005). Burdekin, Hossfeld, and Smith note that although the NBA, as a whole, does
not erect racially discriminatory barriers to entry, there remains a correlation between a
team's racial composition and the racial composition of the city in which the team is based.
Id at 156 n.8.
136.

WILLIAM C. RiODEN, $40 M[LLION SLAVES: THE RISE, FALL, AND REDEMPTION OF

THE BLACK ATMLETE 67 (2006).

137. Ilyana M. Kuziemko & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Customer Racial Discrimination in
Major League Baseball. Is There No Hope for Equal Pay 7 TEx. IsP. J.L. & POL'Y 119,
140 (2001). It bears noting that scholars are not united on this score. For instance,
economists Craig A. Depken II and Jon M. Ford, examining fan selection of MLB All-Star
Game participants between the years 1990 and 2000, concluded that there did not exist
customer-based discrimination against minority players. Craig A. Depken II & Jon M. Ford,
Customer-Based Discrimination Against Major League Baseball Players Additional
Evidence from All-Star Ballots, 35 J. OF Socio-EcoN. 1061, 1076-77 (2006), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2005.11.057.
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number of nonwhite players in the league and to do so by means of the
Policy While MLS has never made any such admission, it has
considered, and catered to, perceived fan preferences regarding race
and ethnicity through its allocation of players among teams. 8 While
such strategic allocation does not confirm that MLS instituted the
Policy as a means of satisfying league-wide race-based customer
discrimination, it certainly supports that possibility.
2.

Building the Race Discrimination Case: The Individual Action

Of course, though precedented and perhaps rational, if MLS
intentionally limits the numbers of blacks and Latinos in its ranks, it
violates Title VII's prohibition on race-based discrimination.'" And
while there does not appear to exist evidence of such intent, no such
evidence is necessary for Title VII liability to adhere. Indeed,
recognizing the often covert nature of discrimination in America,'4 ° the
Supreme Court has concluded that plaintiffs need not present direct
evidence of discrimination to establish Title VII liability. In fact,
through its decisions in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green" and
138. Stefan Fatsis, Fdtbol Invades the US.-Again: Major League Soccer Goal Is
Survival, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1996, at B9 (detailing MLS's strategic initial player assignments).
139. The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which
Congress created to enforce Title VII, see Julie Chi-hye Suk, AntidiscriminaionLaw in the
Administative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 405, 438 (2006), categorizes Latinos/as as a racial
group for Title VII purposes and protects them from race-based employment discrimination.
See also U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Race/Color Discrimination,
http://archive.eeoc.gov/types/race.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2009) ("Equal employment
opportunity cannot be denied any person because of his/her racial group ....Title VII's
prohibitions apply regardless of whether the discrimination is directed at Whites, Blacks,
"). Latinos/as are, however, "racially heterogeneous" rendering this
Asians, Latinos ....
racial categorization awkward and problematic. Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos:
De-ConftatingLatinos/as'RaceandEthmiciy, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 69, 90-94 (1998);
Angela P.Harris, From Color Line to Color Chart?: Racism and Colonsm in the New
Century, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & PoLy 52, 57-58 (2008). This reduction of
"Latinos[/as] to an American racialized group" ignores historical differences and diverse
experiences among members of the Latino/a community, Sandrino-Glasser, supra at 93-94,
and has confused judges. See Harris, supra, at 57. Nonetheless, because Title VII deems
Latinos/as a protected racial group, Title VII would potentially provide a Latino MLS player
or prospective player a cause of action for racial employment discrimination.
140. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 978 (1988) ("Simply because
no inference of discriminatory intent can be drawn ...it does not follow that these
Even if it is assumed that
supervisors always act without discriminatory intent.
discrimination by individual supervisors can be adequately policed through disparate
treatment analysis, that analysis would not solve the problem created by subconscious
stereotypes and prejudices that lead to conduct prohibited by Title VII.").
141. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973).
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Texas Department of Commuity Affairs v Burd ne, 42 the Court

created a three-stage burden-shifting framework designed
to identify
3
veiled intentional discrimination in Title VII cases.1
As an initial matter, under the framework, a plaintiff is required to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.'" To do so, he must
show that (1) he belongs to a class of individuals protected under Title
VII, (2) he was qualified for the position,'5 (3) he was rejected despite
his qualifications, and (4) the position remained open for other
candidates to pursue."4
If the plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its challenged employment action.' 7 Assuming
142. Tex. Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 (1981).
143. See McDonnellDouglasCorp., 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine,450 U.S. at 254.
144. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.
While the prima facie case is an established element of Title VII disparate treatment actions,
many commentators have long viewed it as unhelpful and unnecessary for the disposition of
disparate treatment cases. See Posting of Paul Secunda to Workplace Prof Blog, http://law
professors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2008/04/whats-so-great.html (Apr. 22, 2008). The
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently joined these calls for its
elimination, asserting the prima facie case inquiry is "a largely unnecessary sideshow [that]
has not benefited employees or employers; nor has it simplified or expedited court
proceedings." Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 E3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Going
forward in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the court decreed,
when hearing a Title VII disparate treatment action:
the ... court need not-and should not-decide whether the plaintiff actually
made out a prima facie case under McDonnellDouglas. Rather, in considering an
employer's motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law... , the
.. court must resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's asserted nondiscriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally
discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin?
Id.
145. Importantly, to satisfy this prong of the prima facie case, plaintiff need not prove
greater qualification than the person ultimately hired, and according to some courts, need not
prove equal qualification to the person ultimately hired. See THOMAS R. HAGGARD,
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCIMINATION 69-70 (2001). Rather, the plaintiff must

prove qualification as evidenced by meeting the position's minimum criteria. Id.
146. See McDonnellDouglasCorp., 411 U.S. at 802.
147. Id Under traditional disparate treatment analysis, a defendant may, rather than
proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, acknowledge it discriminated
and seek shelter under the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) doctrine. See
Clare Tower Putnam, Comment, When Can a Law Firm Discriminate Among Its Own
Employees To Meet a Clientk Request? Reflections on the ACC Call to Action, 9 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMp. L. 657, 662-63 (2007).

This narrow doctrine protects discrimination otherwise prohibited under Title VII if the
discrimination is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise." 42 U.S.C 2000e-2(e)(l) (2006). It is, of course, difficult to imagine MLS
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the defendant satisfies this burden, plaintiff may ultimately prevail by
proving, again by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's
proffered reason is pretext for unlawful discrimination.1' 8
The first two of the framework's three steps do not require
overwhelming showings. Although a plaintiff carries a burden of
persuasion in making its prima facie case, courts have found the
plaintiff need only create a mere inference of discrimination to meet
the burden."9 The defendant's burden in responding to the prima facie
case is even lower. It need not persuade. It need only produce
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its challenged Policy or
decision.15 And whether defendant's reasons be "silly," "implausible,"
"fantastic," or "superstitious," as long as they are nondiscriminatory,
courts may deem them sufficient."'
a.

The Pretext Inquiry

Consequently, an individual plaintiff's challenge to an
employment decision based on the Policy would likely turn on the
pretext inquiry, as disparate treatment challenges often do-with the
plaintiff arguing the citizenship status-based decision not to hire,
ostensibly lawful under Title VII, is pretext for Title VII prohibited
discrimination.
Plaintiff's argument would, ironically, find support in the
Supreme Court's Espinoza opinion. Although the Espinoza Court, as
already discussed, rejected Cecilia Espinoza's national origin claim in
distinguishing citizenship discrimination from national origin
discrimination and proclaiming the former lawful under Title VII, the
Court warned against employers using citizenship discrimination as
pretext.' 2 The Court recognized that its decision might spur employers
conceding that its international player restrictions are pretext for racial discrimination and
then arguing that being a member of a particular race is a BFOQ for playing in MLS.
Assuming, however, that MLS did so, its argument would be unavailing as the BFOQ defense
does not apply in cases of race or color discrimination. Id.
148.

See McDonnell DouglasCorp., 411 U.S. at 804.

149. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (establishing a
prima facie case is "not onerous"); see also Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 E3d 38,
40-41 (5th Cir. 1996) (a prima facie case requires "a very minimal showing").

150. SeeBurdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
151. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). The ease with which defendants meet
this burden is legendary. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

has gone so far as to hold that an "employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad
reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reasonat all,as long as its action is not
for a discriminatory reason." Nix v. WLCY Radio, 738 E2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984)

(emphasis added).
152.

Espinoza 414 U.S. at 92.
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to effectuate unlawful Title VII discrimination under the cloak of
citizenship discrimination, and made clear that such manipulation
would not be tolerated. And while the Espinoza court referenced
citizenship discrimination as pretext for national origin discrimination,
its concern-that citizenship discrimination not crater Title VII's
protections-logically applies also in the race-discrimination context,
as the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recognized in Anderson v Zubieta. '
In that case, the Panama Canal Commission (PCC) implemented
a policy advantaging employees who were American citizens as of a
specific date over noncitizens and citizens naturalized after the
specified date.'54 Plaintiffs, who were black and of Panamanian
descent and who were naturalized after the specified date, sued on
Title VII race discrimination and national origin discrimination
grounds, alleging that through the policy the PCC intentionally
disadvantaged them. 5' Although the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as
nonactionable under Title VII, the D.C. Circuit Court reversed.' 6 The
D.C Circuit found that the Espinoza Court envisioned lower courts
granting such plaintiffs the opportunity to prove that a Title VII
prohibited purpose-whether discrimination based on race or national
origin-underlies an employer's citizenship discrimination.'57
This pretext inquiry, in the MLS context, would necessarily
involve scrutinizing MLS's articulated reasons for limiting international players' presence in the league. While it is, of course, not
possible to precisely predict the reasons MILS would articulate, the
Policy seems to exist to serve MLS's goals of: (1) ensuring consistent
spectator support among American fans,' 8 (2) providing a training
ground for U.S. citizen players so as to improve the national soccer

153. 180 E3d 329, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
154. Id.at 333.
155. Id.
at 334.
156. Id. at 332.
157. Id.at 340.
158. See David Leonhardt, Is MajorLeague Soccer UsingIts Head? Its StructureMay
Avoid Problems Plaguing Other Sports, Bus. WK., Jan. 29, 1996, at 52, available at 1996
WLNR 3647419 ("To help build a U.S. market, MLS has also made a commitment to
promoting U.S.-born players. Alexi Lalas ... will play for the New England Revolution, and
his face will grace a box of Kellogg's cereal later this year. That's a direct appeal to the 13
million soccer-playing kids in the U.S.").
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team's quality,'59 and (3) preventing a fiscally disastrous spending race
on international stars. 6
It does not appear, however, that discriminating against
international players actually serves these ends. Indeed, the Bosman
court considered these very justifications for nationality restrictions,
and concluded they do not. 6 While the Bosman holding is, as already
discussed, binding only in the European Community, its reasoning
applies with equal strength in the American context.'
i.

Ensuring Consistent Spectator Support

The Bosman defendants argued, just as MLS Policy proponents
have argued, that citizenship discrimination is necessary to consistent
spectator support.'

They asserted, "[I]dentification of the spectators

with the various teams [in the league] is guaranteed only if those teams
consist, at least as regards a majority of the players, of nationals of the
relevant Member State."'" 6 The ECJ summarily dismissed this justification, explaining there was "no need for extensive discussion to show

159. See Grahame L. Jones, Time To Deliver the $22-Million Soccer Goods, L.A.
TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1996, at Cl ("The experience might not be there because [American players]
haven't had the chance. I think what MLS is going to do is showcase that talent. In a very
short amount of time I think we're going to get to a level of play that's competing with
leagues around the world." (quoting Alexi Lalas, 1995 U.S. Player of the year)); Jerry
Langdon, US. Talent Gets Chance To Play at Home, USA TODAY, Apr. 5, 1996, at 8C
(reporting on MLS Deputy Commissioner Sunil Gulati's opinion that the MLS provides an
opportunity for American players without international experience to compete for a place on
the national team); see also Dan Giesin, Debut Is Here for New SoccerLeague MLS Hopes
Top PlayersAreBig Daw,S.F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 1996, at Dl (.'I fully expect us to develop an
American style of play. It will probably take a couple of years to develop, but we'll put our
own thumbprint on soccer."' (quoting MLS Commissioner Doug Logan)); Gus Martins, The
PriceIs Tight Cap Makes It Tougher for MILS To Score, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 4, 1996, at
B7 ("The league's contradiction is in simultaneously attempting to be a launching pad for
rank-and-file American players while luring players of international status to legitimize the
level of play.").
160. See Northrop, supra note 115 ("The MLS approach is different than the NASus
.... The NASL tried to attract a following with star power. International soccer legends such
as Pele, Giorgio Chinaglia and Franz Beckenbauer were signed.... It died in the attempt.");
Tomas Toch & Anna Mulrine, Soccer,American Style, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 28,
1996, at 64-65 ("But a more serious threat is labor problems. Stars like Lalas insist that 'the
last thing we want to do is shoot ourselves in the foot' by forcing a bidding war for players the
fledgling league can't afford.").
161. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Soci6t6s de Football Ass'n ASBL v.
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-492 1,para. 142 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
162. Id para. 137 (Judgment of the Court).
163. Id para. 141 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz); Leonhardt, supra note 158, at
52.
164. See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921 para. 141 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
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Indeed, it noted that many
the weakness of [the] argument."'6
European nations' teams' most popular players were nationals of other
nations, and in some cases, those foreign players served to establish
their teams' identities.6 6 This was the case, the court explained, with
the Italian AC Milan team of the early 1990s, among others.' This
has certainly been the case in American soccer as well, first in the
NASL and later in MLS.
The NASUs New York Cosmos provide perhaps the strongest
illustration. With Brazilian great Pel6 heading the list, the Cosmos
regularly fielded numerous foreign players and often fielded more
foreign players than American players.' 6 Still, they were the NASUs
than had ever previously
most popular team, drawing larger crowds
16
attended soccer games on American soil.
Many of the noncitizen players permitted on MLS teams have
also proven extremely popular among fans. Bolivians Marco
Etchevary and Jamie Moreno long served as the face of MLS's DC
United. 7 ' And, during the league's early years, flamboyant Mexican
goalkeeper, Jorge Campos, did the same for the Los Angeles Galaxy.'7'
More recently, Englishman David Beckham served as the Galaxy's,
and ultimately the League's, public face.' 2
So, in the American context, as well as in the European context,
noncitizens have frequently sparked, rather than detracted from,
spectator support. To justify citizen discrimination as necessary to
maintain observers' interest badly misses the mark.

165. Id.para. 143.
166. Id
167. Id.para. 142.
168. ALLAWAYETAL., supr note 19, at 191-92.
169. Id.at 200. While it is true that many of the Cosmos' foreign players were worldrenowned stars who commanded salaries that precipitated the NASUs financial difficulty, the
fact of their noncitizenship certainly did not lead to decreased popularity or to the league's
decline. So while the financial toll of escalating salaries may reasonably be blamed for the
NASUs demise, the fact of players' noncitizenship may not.
170. See, e.g., Charles Boehm, United Face Must-Win Situation (Oct. 31, 2007),
http://www.mlsnet.com/news/team news.jsp?ymd=20071031&contentid=1 26969 ("[T]he
South Americans are sometimes referred to as the 'magic triangle' by D.C. fans who first
applied the term to Moreno, Raul Diaz Arce and Marco Etcheverry during United's late-90s
glory days.").
171. See L.A. Galaxy, 1996 Season Review, http://web.mlsnet.com/t106/loacdjsp?section =
about&content-history96 (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
172. See Jonah Freedman, Pel6 Part Two, (July 22, 2007), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.
com/2007/writers/jonahfreedman/07/22/beckham.pele.
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Strengthening the National Team

A second justification asserted by the Bosman defendants in
supporting its citizenship status restrictions and later asserted to justify
the MLS policy, is the importance of such restrictions in developing a
competitive national soccer team.' 3 The ECJ found this argument no
more convincing than the previous one.'74 Indeed, rather than enabling
national team development, nationality restrictions may hamper it.
The ECJ explained, "[T]here is much to support the opinion that the
participation of top foreign players promotes the development of
[soccer]. Early contact with foreign stars 'can only be of advantage to
a young player.""" If this is the case in Europe, it must certainly be the
case in the United States, where soccer is generally played at a lower
level than it is played elsewhere in the world.'76 By limiting the
numbers of excellent international players against whom Americans
can compete, and from whom they can learn, the MLS policy may
have an inverse impact to what the league intended-it may be
stagnating, rather than improving, American soccer talent.'
It is certainly the case that, if the MLS were to halt its discriminatory Policy and noncitizens were to occupy some of the roster spots
currently reserved for citizens, fewer citizen players would be able to
compete in the nation's premier soccer league. The competing citizen
players, however, would be exposed to a level of play that would likely
improve them and thus the national team for which they would be
candidates. The status quo produces many citizen players who, by
virtue of the competition they face, may not fulfill their potential.
Eliminating the discriminatory policy, on the other hand, would result
in fewer citizen players who would likely be better than they would
173. See Case C-415/93, Union Royale Beige des Soci~ts de Football Ass'n ASBL v.
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz); Langdon, supra note 159,
at 8C.
174. Bosman, para. 144 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
175. Id.para. 145 (quoting Christoph Palme, Hermann Hepp-Schwab & Stephan
Wilske, Freiigigkeit im Profisport EG-rechtliche Gewfhrleistungen und prozessuale
Durchsetzbarkei4JURISTENZErrTNG 343 (1994)).
176. See Omar Hafez Ayad, Note, Take the Training Wheels Off the League: Major
League Soccer Dysfunctional Relationship with the InternationalSoccer Transfer System,
10 VAI'D. J. ENT. & TEcH.L. 413, 439-40 (2008) ("The American league's coaches, players,
and critics agree that MLS currently does not possess the means to compete effectively with
the European giants.").
177. MLS organizers recognized, as the Bosman Court did, that foreign players might
benefit the development of American MLS players, but nonetheless insisted on firm
international restrictions, apparently believing too many foreign players would have a
detrimental impact on the league. Alex Yannis, ML.S. Is Encourage4 butRemains Cautious,
N.Y. TDMEs, Oct. 22, 1996, at B17.
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otherwise. Perhaps then, abandoning citizenship discrimination may
ultimately be more beneficial than detrimental to the U.S. national
team's prospects.'
iii. Controlling Salaries
Finally, the Bosman defendants argued nationality restrictions
were necessary to maintain rough parity among a given league's
clubs. 79' Because foreign stars often command extremely high salaries,
the argument goes, the absence of nationality restrictions would permit
wealthy clubs to attract topflight foreign players to whom less wealthy
clubs would have no access. Taken a step further, this argument
mirrors the argument bom of the NASUs demise-that demand for
foreign players drives up competition for their services, prompting
80
clubs to overspend and eventually precipitate league collapse.'
While maintaining parity and preventing excessive spending are
legitimate goals, 8 ' as the Bosman Court explained in rejecting

178. An altered approach to international players' inclusion in MLS as a means of
strengthening the United States Men's National Soccer team could not hurt, as the team has
proceeded beyond opening round games only once in Olympic tournament play, see
Soccertimes.com, Penalty Kick decisive for Chile Which Takes Bronze Medal 2-0 (Sept. 29,
2000), http://www.soccertimes.com/usteams/2000/games/sep29.htm, and has done so only
once in three World Cup Championship tournament appearances since MLS's origin, see
Sampson Out as U.S. Soccer Coach (Oct. 27, 1998), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/soccer/
world/events/1998/worldcup/news/1998/06/29/sampsonfinal; US Exit Signals End of Era
(July 10, 2006), http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/archive/germany2006/news/newsid=27337.
html.
179. Bosman, para. 147 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
180. See John Haydon, MLS Teams Designed To Have Equal Footing,WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 1996, at D6 (noting that a big factor in the demise of the NASL was financial
inequality between teams).
181. Regulating salaries to maintain parity among a league's teams would seem, at
first blush, to violate anticompetitive principles. Sport, however, presents a unique case with
respect to antitrust issues. As sports law scholar Stephen Ross explains:
Sports leagues present special challenges for those interested in a sound, consumeroriented approach to antitrust enforcement.... In addition to the need for joint
action to produce a product, sports leagues have perhaps a unique interest in
maintaining a significant degree of competitive balance among the teams within
their venture.
MATTHEW J. MITTEN, TIMOTHY DAVIS, RODNEY K. SMITH & ROBERT C. BERRY, SPORTS LAW
AND REGULATION 418-19 (2005).
As such, the Supreme Court has recognized that in the context of sports leagues, "some
agreements among competitors-perhaps even all the competitors-is necessary for there to
be a product at all." Id
Even among sports leagues, however, MLS is uniquely positioned to repel antitrust
challenges, because the Supreme Court has deemed it a single entity, incapable-by
definition-of conspiring to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See
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Bosman's argument, there exist narrower and less burdensome means
of achieving those goals than citizenship discrimination. 82' Indeed, an
MLS regime of citizenship discrimination as a means of controlling
salaries necessarily presupposes the MLS's highest salaried players are
all noncitizens. This presupposition is false. Many noncitizens are
modestly salaried and several citizens, to whom the citizenship
restrictions purportedly seeking to control salaries obviously do not
apply, rank among the league's top earners.'83 In the MLS context,
therefore, citizen discrimination falls flat as a rational approach to
salary regulation.
An MLS concern about escalating salaries would suggest, as an
appropriate remedy, reliance on salary--rather than citizenshiprestrictions. And, indeed, the MILS has, since its founding, enforced
salary restrictions. At its inception, each team had a salary cap of
$1.13 million.'
By the start of the 2009 season's inception, MLS
increased the salary cap to $2.3 million.'85 Any argument that the
Policy is necessary to control salaries therefore fails.
It seems clear then that the MLS Policy and the resulting
discriminatory personnel decisions do not fulfill the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory purposes upon which MILS would most likely rely
in repelling a disparate treatment challenge. Further, it is possible,
perhaps probable, that MiLS long ago recognized, by way of the
Bosman decision or otherwise, the Policy's impotence in satisfying the
goals it purportedly existed to satisfy. A showing that the Policy does
not serve the purposes for which it was ostensibly enacted and that,
despite knowing this, the MLS nonetheless enacted and enforced it,
would certainly indicate pretext.
Even if, however, a Court were to conclude that (1) the Policy
serves legitimate nondiscriminatory purposes, or (2) the Policy does
Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 97 E Supp. 2d 130, 142 (D. Mass. 2000) (dismissing
eight MLS players' complaint alleging MLS artificially suppressed players' salaries).
182. Bosman, para. 142 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
183. See Major League Soccer Players Union, Player Salary Information (2008),
Indeed, two of MILS's
http://www.mlsplayers.org/files/9 7_08_salaryinfo alpha.pdf.
highest paid players-Landon Donavan and Claudio Lopez-are American. Id.
184. See Barry Wilner, Will It Fly? New Soccer League Finally Nearing Takeoff
Time, PHILA. INQ., Mar. 31, 1996, at C8.
185. See Nate Covert, 2009 MLS Team Building: What New League Rules Mean for
Your Team (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1407249/2009 mis_
team..building-what newleague.html. Notably, each MLS team is permitted one Designated
Player, to whom it may pay an unregulated amount, only $415,000 of which applies against
the salary cap. 2009 MLS Player Rules & Regulations Summary, supm note 1. Teams are
permitted to trade Designated Player slots as long as no team accrues any more than two such
slots. Id.
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not serve legitimate nondiscriminatory purposes, but that MLS
sincerely believes it does serve such purposes, the Court's conclusion
would not necessarily derail a plaintiff's claim. In 1991, the United
States Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to permit mixed
motive disparate treatment claims, which allow plaintiffs to
successfully challenge employment decisions that are based on
multiple factors. So, under a mixed motive theory, a plaintiff may
prevail upon showing that, in addition to considering nondiscriminatory factors, the defendant considered the plaintiff's race, color, gender,
national origin, or religion, in denying employment opportunities.'8 6 A
mixed motive approach therefore would likely expand an international
player's prospects for success. '
b.

The "Similarly Situated" Inquiry and the Subjective
Decision Maker

Whether a plaintiff pursues single motive or mixed motive
liability, courts do not, as already noted, require from the plaintiff
direct discriminatory evidence.'88 And assuming, as is often the case,
that no direct discriminatory evidence exists, courts are left to consider
the proffered evidence and draw, or decline to draw, an inference of
discrimination from it. 9 Whatever other evidence comprises the
record, the presiding court would focus heavily on a comparison
between the plaintiff who was denied MLS employment as a player
with a particular team and at least one similarly situated white player
who secured such employment, with a favorable comparison
suggesting pretext."
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90,
101-02 (2003).
187. Notably, a mixed motive theory provides limited relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g)(2)(B). A prevailing mixed-motive plaintiff would be entitled to declaratory and
injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and costs, but not to hiring, reinstatement, or damages.
188. DesertPalace,539 U.S. at 99-100.
189. Id at 101. Pursuant to Title VII, "a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence
for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of evidence, that ... '[the protected
characteristic] was a motivating factor for any employment practice."' Id.
190. See Tricia M. Beckles, Comment, Class of One. Are Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs at an Insurmountable Disadvantage If They Have No "Similarly Situated"
ComparatorsZ 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EM. L. 459, 466 (2008) ("Evidence of... pretext may
include showing that a similarly situated individual, outside the protected class, was treated
more favorably"); Holly A. Williams, Comment, Reaching Across Difference: Extencing
Equalityr Reach To Encompass Governmental Programs that Solely Benelit Women, 13
UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 375, 387 (2005) ("[]n order to succeed on a claim of racial
discrimination brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the plaintiff must
satisfy the similarly situated requirement... ").
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Conducting a meaningful comparison, however, can be
challenging, particularly in the sports employment context.'9' While
some indicia of an athlete's success or potential success, such as speed
and reaction time, are easily quantifiable, others, such as willingness to
sacrifice individual glory for the team's ultimate benefit, are not.'92
And because entirely objective assessment is not always possible,
courts generally defer to defendants' subjective assessments.9 Such
deference, of course, impedes plaintiffs' attempts to identify the
assessments as unlawfully discriminatory, which consequently
hamstrings individual plaintiffs' Title VII disparate treatment actions."
So, while the Burdine burden-shifting framework exists to aid
individual plaintiffs in establishing intentional discrimination claims,
the deference routinely granted employers' subjective assessments
ultimately tarnishes Burdine's promise.
3.

Building the Race Discrimination Case: The Class Action

Where, however, plaintiffs band together as a class to challenge
not just individual adverse employment decisions, but an employer's
pattern or practice of organization-wide discrimination, they are spared
such defendant deference in attempting to prove liability. Recognizing
the inefficiencies of Burdihe-style analyses for hundreds or thousands
of class members as well as the dangers of defendants prevailing in
Title VII actions when discrimination may exist throughout an
organization but is not readily apparent on the face of any particular
employment decision, the Supreme Court, in its 1977 Teamsters v
United States decision, created a model of proof applicable in class
cases.'95 Rather than require the fact-specific analysis crucial to
individual plaintiffs' disparate treatment actions, the Teamsters Court
called for statistical analysis reflective of discrimination.'96 Under
191.
192.

See Duru, supm note 4, at 378.
Id.

193.
194.

Id. at 404.
Id

195. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337-40 (1977); see also
Melissa Hart, Will Employment DiscrimnationClass Actions Survives 37 AKRON L. REV.
813, 816-18 (2004); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 E2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971)

("Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the courts have frequently relied upon
statistical evidence to prove a violation.... In many cases the only available avenue of proof
is the use of racial statistics to uncover clandestine and covert discrimination by the employer
or union involved").
196. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20 ("Statistics showing racial or ethnic
imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only because such imbalance is often a
telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected
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Teamsters, plaintiffs can create a presumption of discrimination
through showing that the percentage of a particular racial group in a
defendant's workforce is smaller than the percentage of that racial
group in the broader labor market.'97
Under Teamsters,therefore, international players of color who are
denied MLS roster positions and are unable to, or uninterested in,
pursuing individual disparate treatment actions by way of the Burdine
burden-shifting framework, might be advised to sue MLS as a class.'98
To create the presumption of discrimination, however, the international
players would need to prove a statistically significant disproportionality between the number of players of color in MLS and the
number of players of color eligible and qualified to play in MLS. 9 '
Courts require statistical significance to ensure the disparity's scope is
sufficient to suggest intentional discrimination as opposed to
coincidence."'
However, the proper means of deriving statistical significance is a
matter of seemingly endless debate, and disparate treatment class
action cases, therefore, generally feature battling statisticians'
testimony on this score."' Indeed, MLS would certainly challenge
whatever statistical analysis the international players produce "as to the
that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less
representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from
which employees are hired.").
197. Id at 337-40; see also Michelle Adams, CausationandResponsibilityin Tort and
Affirmative Action, 79 TEX. L. REv. 643, 688-90 (2001). The appropriate contours of the
relevant labor market used in conducting disparate treatment statistical analysis unfailingly
produces significant debate among parties to an action. See Fred W Alvarez, Michael J.
Levy & Shirley C. Wang, Class Actions and Pattern and Pmctice Claims: Overview of
Theories,Defenses, Settlements and the Government Activist Role, 591 PLILIT 275, 308
(1998). Such debate would certainly ensue in this case, with the player plaintiffs arguing for
a relevant labor market rich in players of color and MLS arguing for the inverse.
198. Whether players interested in launching a class action and representing their
fellow class members would meet the requirements of doing so would depend on the players'
circumstances. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a):
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class; and
(4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
199. SeeMcCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-97 (1987).
200. Tristin K. Green, Discriminationin Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account ofDisparateTreatment Theory,38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 91, 120-22 (2003).
201. Seeid.
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statistical test used, the assumptions employed in conducting the test,
and the conclusion the test suggests., 22 If, however, the plaintiffs were
to set forth a statistically significant disproportionality together with
some accompanying anecdotal evidence, they would likely establish
Title VII liability.2°3 Doing so would render injunctive relief
appropriate, ° meaning a court could enjoin MLS from effectuating
the Policy. In addition, doing so would create, in each plaintiff's
circumstance, a presumption of discrimination and, therefore, an
entitlement to damages-unless MLS is able to show race was
irrelevant to the particular player's rejection. °5
B.

The MLS Policyas DisparateImpactDiscriminaton

Absent an intentional discrimination showing, whether in the
individual or class context, plaintiffs may still prevail under Title VII
by way of disparate impact analysis. Recognizing both the difficulty
of proving discriminatory intent and discrimination's detrimental
impact on society whatever its motivation, courts have established that
Title VII relief is potentially appropriate even in cases of unintentonal
discrimination by way of disparate impact claims.0 6
Disparate impact analysis, like disparate treatment analysis,
features a three-step burden-shifting framework, the first step of which
requires that plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of discrimination."7
The nature of the required prima facie case in the disparate impact
context is, however, quite different than in the disparate treatment
context. Rather than proving protected class status, qualification, and
202. Duru, supra note 4, at 403.
203. Although some courts have deemed a statistically significant showing sufficient
to establish TeamstersTitleVII liability, see United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n,
Local Union No. 36, 416 E2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969), other courts appear to require some
corroborative anecdotal evidence as well. See John Cocchi Day, Comment, Retelling the
Story ofAffirmative Action. Reflections on a Decade ofFederalJurisprudencein the Public
Workplace, 89 CAL. L. REv. 59, 96-98 (2001).
204. See United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 38, 428 E2d 144 (6th
Cir. 1970); Rowe v. Gen. Motors Corp. 457 E2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
205. Ellen M. Athas, Defendant Burden ofProofin Title VII ClassAction Disparate
Treatment Suits, 31 AM. U. L. REv. 755, 778-79 (1982). Once the presumption of
discrimination is established, the court would launch a series of mini-trials focusing on the
specific facts of each member of the class, during which the employer would carry the
burden of showing, with respect to each class member, that it did not discriminate. Id at 77980.
206. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("[G]ood intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures ... that operate as
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.").
207. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,446-47 (1982).
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rejection under suspicious circumstances, disparate impact plaintiffs'
prima facie cases generally consist of statistics designed to show that a
requirement of employment disproportionately impacts members of a
particular protected group."8
For instance, in Gnggs v Duke Power, the case in which the
Supreme Court first recognized the Title VII disparate impact theory,
plaintiffs challenged Duke Power's requirement that employees in
several of the company's departments achieve a threshold score on
standardized examinations, through showing that the requirement
disproportionately disqualified black candidates.2" Courts accept
various methodological approaches to this end."' The G/uggs plaintiffs
presented applicant flow analysis, comparing the proportion of black
candidates in the applicant pool who did not achieve the threshold
score with the proportion of black candidates who did achieve the
score and thus qualified for employment. "' Another Supreme Courtsanctioned methodological approach to establishing a disparate impact
prima facie case is external availability analysis, which, like the pattern
or practice disparate treatment statistical inquiry discussed above,
compares the composition of the employer's workforce with that of a
relevant labor market.2 '
If plaintiffs were to succeed in marshalling data revealing that, as
a statistically significant matter, the Policy disproportionately impacts
black and Latino players and if MLS were unable to challenge the
statistical model's integrity or otherwise cast doubt upon it, MLS
would have the opportunity to show that the Policy is job related and is
consistent with business necessity."' The idea behind this second step
in the three-step disparate impact analysis is that an employment
requirement necessary to a business's existence, even if disproportionately impactful, potentially merits preservation."'
The job208. Erik R. Sunde, Case Note, Civil Rights-Title VII DisparateImpact TheoryEmployers Burden ofRebutting Prima Facie Case UnderDisparateImpact Theory Is One of
Production Wile UltimateBurden ofPersuasionRemains with Complainan421 ST. MAW's
L.J. 1081, 1087-88 (1990).
209. Griggs,401 U.S. at 431-32. Duke Power also required that the employees in these
departments had graduated from high school. Id at 427-28.
210. James P. Ratz, Case Note, Requiring Discriminatory Intent and Relevant
Statistical Evidence in Title VII Cases- Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 16 HAMLINE L. REv. 1003, 1018 (1993).
211. See Gn'ggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
212. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,309 n.14 (1977).
213. William Gordon, Recent Development, The Evolution of the Disparate Impact
Theory ofTitle V1: A HypotheticalCase Study,44 HARV. J.ON LEGIS. 529, 530-31 (2007).
214. See Gn'ggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34; seeAlbemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975).
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related/business-necessity inquiry is, however, notoriously amorphous,
with different courts applying different standards.21 Whatever the
standard, MLS would likely turn to its justifications for implementing
the Policy and argue that the league's financial success, as a matter of
both salary control and spectator support, necessarily requires
international player limits.
Plaintiffs would then have the opportunity to show that MELS
could have used a less discriminatory alternative than the international
player restriction to meet that necessit/' 6-for instance, stringent
league-wide salary restrictions together with marketing campaigns
calculated to familiarize American soccer fans with international
players. If the Court were to conclude plaintiffs' alternatives
adequately serve MLS's business need, liability would become a
possibility.217
While the likelihood of success for players challenging the MLS
Policy under a disparate impact theory would depend on, among other
things, the nature of their proffered statistics, the contours of MLS's
response, and the court's view of the business necessity inquiry, the
potential for success certainly exists.
At bottom then, whether or not MLS intended that its Policy

discriminatorily erect race-based barriers of entry into the league, the
Policy has resulted in such barriers to entry and has therefore served to
exclude players of color. Consequently, the MLS Policy is potentially
vulnerable to Title VII attack, whether as intentionally discriminatory
or as resulting in a discriminatory disparate impact.
215. See, e.g., Zamlen v. City of Cleveland, 906 E2d 209, 218 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding
that testing will meet the business necessity burden where using a content validity study
demonstrates a direct relationship between the test contents and the job contents); Gillespie v.
Wisconsin, 771 E2d 1035, 1040 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that meeting the burden of job
necessity requires a construct validity study to prove that the challenged test is "adequately
correlated with the applicant's future job performance"); Ass'n of Mexican-American
Educators v. California, 231 E3d 572, 585 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[Meeting the burden of
production to prove job necessity requires the employer to] first specify the particular trait...
which the selection device is being used to identify or measure ... then determine that the
particular trait... is an important element of work behavior[, and f]inally, the employer must
demonstrate by 'professionally acceptable methods' that the selection device is 'predictive of
or significantly correlated' with the element of work behavior identified in the second step.").
216. SeeAlbemarle,422 U.S. at 425.
217. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 E3d 1112, 1122-23 (11 th Cir. 1993) (finding that
the plaintiff's proffered alternatives did not meet the employer's business need of safety, and
thus did not fulfill the third prong of the disparate impact burden shifting test). Some courts
suggest that for plaintiffs to prevail at this stage of the analysis, they must show the defendant
was presented an appropriate alternative and rejected it. Michael J. Zimmer, Individual
DisparateImpact Law: On the PlainMeaning of the 1991 Civil Rights Act 30 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J.473,480-81 (1999).
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VI. THE MLS POLICY CONTEXTUALIZED-SURVEYING THE
AMERICAN SPORTING LANDSCAPE

While the MILS Policy's impact and potential illegality must
necessarily concern a body politic that has rejected racial
discrimination, contextualizing the Policy and its implications on the
broader American sporting landscape unearths an even greater
concern. Such contextualization reveals that for the majority of
premier American sports leagues-particularly the NFL, the NHL, and
the NBA--disregard for citizenship status results in a decreased
proportion of black and Latino players or in the maintenance of the
league's racial status quo, whereas in the MLS, as discussed above,
disregard for citizenship status would result in an increased proportion
of black and Latino players. That the NFL, NHL, and NBA do not
limit international entrants while MLS does suggests that across much
of the American professional sporting landscape, a league's decision in
this regard may rest to some extent on racial considerations. Analyses
of internationalization's racial impact in the NFL, NHL, and NBA
follow.
A.

The NationalFootballLeague

The NFL is unique among America's premier sports leagues in
that football is a truly American sport. It is scarcely played outside of
North America, and although played in Canada, it is minimally
popular there." 8 While the NFL sponsored the now-defunct World
League of American Football which operated in Europe for twelve
years and has held several exhibition games in other nations, football
has not taken hold internationally.2"9 Indeed, throughout most of the
world, the word "football" does not describe the NFUs product.
Rather, "football" describes the game Americans call soccer.22 The
NFUs product is more commonly known, outside the United States, as
"American football."22 ' Further, with rare, if any, exception, the world's
218. Indeed, Canada's Football League, the CFL, "has struggled to define itself" over
the past 20 years and franchises "are happy to break even from year to year." COLN D.
HOWELL, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND CHEERS: SPORT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN CANADA 79
(2001).
219. Prior to the start of the 1998 season, the World League of American Football
changed its name to NFL Europe in an effort to strengthen the link between American
football and Europe. NFL Europa History, http://www.nfl.com/europa/history (last visited
Sept. 16, 2009).
220. See David Riesman & Reuel Denney, Footballin America: A Study in Cultural
Diffusion, 3 Am.Q. 309, 312 (1951).
221. See GERHARD FALK, FOOTBALL AND AMERICAN IDENTITY 7 (2005).
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best football players are American and already play in the NFL or at
American universities."2 NFL teams simply do not mine for talent in
other countries-as many teams in America's other premier sports
no other country boasts a football league
leagues do2 2-and
sufficiently strong to regularly produce promising NFL prospects."4
As such, any sort of NFL citizenship discrimination policy would
have, at most, a negligible impact on player entry into the league and
would not meaningfully alter the league's racial demographics. Thus,
NFL citizenship discrimination would ultimately neither increase nor
decrease the league's proportion of players of color-it would have no
2
appreciable impact."
222. See Kenneth L. Shropshire, Minonrity Issues in ContemporrySports, 15 STAN. L.
& PoL'Y REV. 189, 192 (2004).
223. For years, MLB, NBA, and NHL teams have actively searched internationally for
players. MLB teams generally maintain fully operational baseball training academies in
Latin America, and NBA and NHL teams routinely employ scouts to focus on identifying
Overseas Players Courted by NB.A., N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
international talent. See, e.g.,
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/26/sports/basketball/26flair.html; Keith Loria, Boom
or Bust?, HOCKEY DIG., Summer 2003, at 62 (highlighting the priority that NHL commissioner Gary Bettman places on acquiring international players).
224. The CFL has on occasion produced players who went on to successful careers in
the NFL. Perhaps chief among them is NFL Hall of Fame quarterback Warren Moon, who
played for years with the CFUs Edmonton Eskimos before joining the NFUs Houston Oilers
and then, later in his career, the Seattle Seahawks and Kansas City Chiefs. WILLIAM C.
RHODEN, THIRD AND A MILE: THE TRIALS AND TRIUMPHS OF THE BLACK QUARTERBACK 14243 (2007). Notably, Moon, who was an American collegiate star at the University of
Washington displayed the ability to play quarterback on the NFL level, but because of his
race was not drafted by any of the NFUs teams. Id.at 130. Moon is African-American, and
for decades NFL teams, perhaps saddled with stereotypes of African-American intellectual
inferiority, seemed to reserve the quarterback spot-"football's thinking and control
position"--for whites. See RICHARD LAPCHICK, SMASHING BARRIERS: RACE AND SPORT IN
THE NEW MILLENNIUM 229 (2001). While equal employment opportunity at the quarterback
position has increased since Moon's playing days, black quarterbacks remain disproportionately rare. N. Jeremi Duru, The Fitz PollardAlliance, the Rooney Rule, and the
Quest to 'Eevel the PlayingField"in the NationalFootballLeague, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
179, 184 (2008). As of the 2007 NFL season, although blacks comprised sixty-seven percent
of the league's players, they comprised only twenty percent of the league's quarterbacks. Id.
Issues of race aside, successful CFL transplants into the NFL are exceedingly rare, and
like Moon, such transplants generally are American citizens and would thus be unimpacted
by any NFL citizenship discrimination policy. See TSN, 2007 Rogers CFL Player Awards,
http://www.tsn.ca/cfl/feature/?id=10868 (last visited Sept. 16, 2009). Notably, the 2007 CFL
Most Outstanding Player, Defensive Player, Offensive Lineman, Rookie, and Special Teams
player awards were dominated by the United States with Americans winning four of five
awards and finishing runner-up in all five. Id.
225. This is not to suggest that NFL teams are indifferent to, or ambivalent about,
demographic trends. Indeed, one sports columnist argued that NFL teams have recently
begun, and will, in the future, continue, to intentionally reduce their numbers of black players.
Jason Whitlock, Buffoons Leaving Terrible Legacy (Oct. 19, 2007), http://profootball.scout.
com/2/692467.html.
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The NationalHockeyLeague

The NHL presents a far different context than the NFL. Whereas
the NFL is overwhelmingly populated by Americans, the NHL is
overwhelmingly populated by non-Americans. From its very inception
in 1917, Canadians dominated the NHL. 6 And for much of the
twentieth century, this remained the case.227 During the 1970s,
however, European players began trickling into the league, and with
the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the Eastern Bloc's consequent
dissolution, the trickle became a torrent. 28 By 2002, one-third of the
league's players were European.2 9 Whether Canadian or European,
however, foreign hockey players unquestionably predominate in the
NHL.23O Indeed, although the league is a United States corporation
with its headquarters in New York City and with twenty-four of its
thirty teams based in American cities,213' only nineteen percent of NHL
players are American.232
Unlike in the NFL context, the impact of an NHL policy
substantially limiting international players' involvement would be
extreme. Scores of NHL players would be expurgated, and the league
would present a drastically different brand of hockey. There would
certainly exist players to fill the vacated roster spots, as scores of
Americans play hockey in competitive university programs. 33
226. Terry Wu & Neil Longley, The Applicability ofNAFTA to the Subsidization of
US.-BasedNHL Teams: LegalandEconomic Perspectives,9 LAW & Bus. REv.AM. 571,574
(2003).
227. Id
228. See Brian Ward, The National Hockey LeagueS Collective Bargaining
Agreement: Its Inadequacies in Dealing wth League Internationalization,23 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 747, 760 (2000).
229. Wu & Longley, supra note 226, at 574.
230. ALAIN HAC-I,

THE PHYsics OF HOCKEY, ANALYSIS OF THE NHL PLAYERS BY

COUNTRY OF BIRTH 1 (2006), http://www.thephysicsofhockey'com/documents/country.pdf.
231. The remaining six NHL franchises are based in the Canadian cities of Calgary,
Edmonton, Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. NHL Teams, http://www.nhl.com/
teams (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
232. HACHE, supranote 230, at 1.
233. See NCAA Sports Sponsorship, Division I Men's Ice Hockey, http://webl.
ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec/sponsorship (select "Men's Ice Hockey" from the "Sport" menu;
then select "I" from the discussion menu; and click "Run Report") (last visited Sept. 20,
2009) (listing 58 NCAA Division I hockey programs); NCAA Sports Sponsorship, Division
H Men's Ice Hockey, http://webl.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec/sponsorship (select "Men's Ice
Hockey" from the "Sport" menu; then select "HI" from the discussion menu; and click "Run
Report") (last visited Sept. 20, 2009) (listing 7 NCAA Division II programs); NCAA Sports
Sponsorship, Division III Men's Ice Hockey, http://web1.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec/sponsorship
(select "Men's Ice Hockey" from the "Sport" menu; then select "Ill" from the discussion
menu; and click "Run Report") (last visited Sept. 20, 2009) (listing 83 NCAA Division III
programs).
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However, in that American players are, on the whole, regarded as less
talented than their foreign counterparts, the league's level of play
would drop.2" The NHL would, in essence, become much like MLSa league presenting an athletic product deemed comparatively inferior
by global standards.
Interestingly, such a policy overhaul would produce in the NHL
the very benefits the MLS claims motivate its Policy. The NHL and its
teams would, of course, no longer labor so strenuously under the
weight of their international stars' enormous salaries.23 In addition, an
increased proportion of Americans in the league would, under MLS's
reasoning, serve to maintain the interest of spectators desiring to see
Americans play. The NHL's financial woes are well-documented,23
and potential increases in spectatorship and decreases in salary
burdens would appear quite attractive.
Furthermore, securing roster spots for Americans would ensure
that the NHL serves as a training ground for a larger group of potential
national team players. If international player restrictions improve a
national team, as MLS suggests they do, the NHL would seem a prime
candidate for such restrictions. The NHL, however, takes a different
approach to building the national team and has achieved substantial
success in doing so. The NHL pursues the precise approach the
Bosman court recommended in dismissing the Bosman defendants'
arguments in favor of nationality restrictions. With no international
player restrictions, only the American players good enough to
successfully compete with foreign players for roster spots on the NHUs
teams play in the league. The result has been an average of four
American players per NHL team, 37 but those players consistently play
against the world's best, and the United States National Hockey Team
has, not surprisingly, achieved considerable success. 8
234. SeeTerry Frei, Now More than Ever, the American Hockey Player Has Options,
(Sept. 7, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/columns/story?columnist=frei-terry&id =
3008373 (noting that American-born NHL players have historically played in the Canadian
major junior leagues before the NHL because the NHL had traditionally been "heavily biased
in favor of Canadian major junior products").
235. Nine of the ten highest salaries for NHLUs 2007-08 season were paid to
international players. See Top 25 Hockey Salaries, http://content.usatoday.com/sports/
hockey/nhl/salaries/top25.aspx?year-2007-08 (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
236. See, e.g., Al Strachan, NHIUs Financial System Is as Broken as Ever (July 10,
2008), http://msn.foxsports.com/nhl/story/8331258; Mike Brehm, Study Backs NHIs Claim
of Major Financial Losses (Feb. 2, 2004), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/nhl/200402-12-finances-studyx.htm.
237. SeeFrei, supranote 234.
238. See World Cup Hockey 1996 Summary, http://www.hhof.com/html/Games
SummaryWCUP1996.shtml (last visited Sept. 16, 2009) (summarizing the United States'
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Despite these purported potential benefits of restricting
international entrants-benefits upon which MLS ostensibly bases its
Policy-the NHL does not limit the number of international players
permitted in the league or on a particular team, suggesting that other
considerations-perhaps considerations of racial proportionality,
which have no relevance in the NHL context-motivate international
player restrictions in the MLS context.
While imposing international player restrictions where none
previously existed would present a host of logistical challenges, it is
certainly possible that the NHL, if faced with a talent pool dominated
by international hockey players of color, might view intemationalization differently and impose such restrictions. It is similarly possible
that were soccer as racially homogeneous a sport as hockey, MLS
might view internationalization differently and opt against such
restrictions. One can only speculate as to how each league would react
in the other's racial context. In light of the racial dynamics that
continue to pervade American sport, however, it would be a mistake to
dismiss the possibility that racial considerations might impact those
reactions.
C

The NationalBasketballAssociation

The NBA presents yet another context, different in meaningful
ways from both the NFL and the NHL. For decades after the NBA's
founding in 1946, the NBA was much like the NFL: a league of
Americans playing a game more popular in America than elsewhere in
the world. Beginning in the early 1990s, however, NBA teams' rosters
have grown increasingly international. So, as in the NHL context,
NBA international player restrictions would significantly alter the
league. The impact of the alteration on the NBA's racial demographics
would, however, be quite different than in the NHL context. Whereas
virtually all of the NIlIUs domestic players as well as its international
players are white,239 the NBA's international players are overwhelm-

gold medal win); U.S. Olympic Men's Teams, http://www.usahockey.com (follow "Team
USA" hyperlink; then follow "Men's National Team" hyperlink; then follow the "Olympics"
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 16, 2009) (listing U.S. Olympic performance, including a silver
medal in 2002); Ice Hockey World Championship Prague 2004, http://www.prague.cz/
hockey.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2009) (listing the United States as the bronze medal winner
of the 2004 World Championships).
239. Kevin Allen, O'Ree Sil Blazing Way in NH-!L, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2008, at 1C
(noting that the NHL has only twelve black players).
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ingly white,2 4' and its domestic players are overwhelmingly of color.24'

Disregard for citizenship status in the NBA therefore results in a
substantially larger white presence among NBA players than would
otherwise be the case. And, perhaps for this reason, the NBA has
enthusiastically embraced internationalization.
1.

The NBA's Black Eye: Race, Hip Hop, and Hatred

As noted in Part VA. 1. of this Article, there has long existed in
the NBA, which has a larger percentage of black players than any of
the other premier American professional sports leagues, an ugly racial
dynamic.242 Fans and team owners alike have expressed preferences
for white players and teams have made player personnel decisions
accordingly, particularly with regard to reserve players. In recent
years, this documented desire among the NBA's white fans for "seeing
white players ' seems to have merged with a strong distaste for
expressions of hip-hop culture and for the young black athletes who
embody it. Hip-hop, a term often simplistically utilized as a synonym
for rap music, is in fact a complex multifaceted phenomenon born in
New York City during the late 1970s, which encompasses music,
dance, art, style of dress, and perspective.2" In the decades since its
emergence, hip-hop culture has spread beyond New York City to other
American urban areas, throughout middle-America, and ultimately
across much of the world." 5 Indeed, hip-hop culture has so pervaded
American culture that Fortune 500 companies routinely utilize it to
market products of all sorts.2"

240. Richard Lapchick, Money Speaks Louder than Race, (May 10, 2004), http://
sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=lapchick/040510 (noting that sixty-eight percent
of the NBA's international players are white).
241. Professor Lapchick notes that only twenty percent of the NBA's players are white,
and just over half of those players are domestic players, making white domestic players a
profound minority in the NBA. Id.
242. SeeDuru, supranote 4, at 395-96.
243. Brown et al., supra note 132, at 343.
244. See Greg Dimitriadis, Hip Hop: From Live Performance to MediatedNarative,
15 POPULAR MUSIC 179, 179-80 (1996) ("Early MCs (or 'rappers') and DJs, graffiti artists
and break dancers, forged a 'scene' entirely dependent upon face-to-face social contact and
interaction... [and it] was intrinsic to hip hop culture .... ").
245. See IMANI PERRY, PROPHETS OF THE HOOD 19, 23 (2004).
246. See David Kiley, Hip Hop Gets Down with the Deals BUSINESSWEEK.COM, May

16, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/may2005/nf200505 16_5797_
db016.htm. Hip-hop culture is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon deserving far greater
attention than this piece can provide. For an in-depth treatment of hip-hop culture, see
generally PERRY, supranote 245.
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Still, although various commercial enterprises as well as
individuals from various nations, of various races, and representing all
walks of life, embrace hip-hop culture, hip-hop culture finds itself
monolithized and caricatured as young, black, irreverent in dress and
manner, and potentially criminal.24' And among substantial sectors of
the American sports-watching public, there has seemingly developed
an intense revulsion to this hip-hop caricature, which applies to
athletes viewed--correctly or incorrectly-as reflecting it, whatever
the athletes' attributes.
Several years ago, in a Sports lustated magazine column,
journalist Rick Reilly exposed this revulsion and its prejudicial
danger.2 48 Reilly begins the column by asking the reader to close his or
her eyes while Reilly describes an NBA legend.14 ' Reilly then launches
the description:
Compared with the rest of today's superstars, he's small-mostly heart
and scabs-but as tough as a '48 pickup.... He could carry an
offense, a team, a city by himself. One night he would torch an
opponent for 50 points and the next decide to beat the opposition with
assists. He was unpredictable, unguardable and unforgettable.... He
was the idol of millions around the world, one of the three greatest
players of his day... He was shy with the press, yet honest as a
Sunday confessional. He dressed the same every day and was mocked
for it.... This guy had the 100,000-watt smile of a lotto winner.20 He
had the joy of the game in his blood, and he knew how to spread it.1
Having described the player, Reilly explains that the player is not Jerry
West or Michael Jordan or John Stockton or Magic Johnson-all
widely respected and revered NBA stars who, in some respects, fit the
description.25 The player, he states, is the much-maligned Allen
Iverson.2 "That changes everything, doesn't it?" asks Reilly, "Now
you see the cornrows and the tattoos and the pierce-holes dripping
gold, and25' 3they bug you, right? You think thug and rapper and
ciminal.

Reilly penned his column in reaction to the deluge of hate mail
Sports Illustrated received after Iverson appeared shirtless, tattooed,

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See PERRY, supra note 245, at 109.
Rick Reilly, LooksAren "tEverything,SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,May 28, 2001, at 94.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
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bejeweled, and expressionless on the magazine's cover. Among the
readers' complaints:
- "The cover with Allen Iverson made me sick to my stomach ......

- 'Those preening idiots barely belong to the human race."
- "[The] stare, tattoos and pants to the waist showing his jockstrap
sum up the reason I have not watched an NBA game in years."
- "The picture ofAllen Iverson is revolting."
'254
- "I object to this grotesque and irreverent picture."
Notably, the irate readers were objecting neither to the feature
story on Iverson, nor to his being on the magazine's cover.255 Nor were
they objecting to the sight of a shirtless athlete; indeed, such
photographs are commonplace in sports magazines. 56 Readers
objected to the particular manner in which Iverson appeared-as
he
2' 57
felt most comfortable, in Reilly's words, "hip-hop to his heart.'
Reilly argued that fans were anxious to enjoy the skill,
athleticism, and determination of Iverson, but not his particular
expression of hip-hop culture. They desired the basketball prowess,
Reilly insisted, but in a more palatable package. The NBA has clearly
recognized what Reilly expressed, and, without question, has
responded to the fans' desire-initially with regard to Iverson alone
and eventually pursuant to league-wide rule. Regarding Iverson, the
NBA was so concerned about his appearance that when it featured him
on the cover of its Hoop Magazine,the league literally stripped him of

254. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
255. Complaints on either ground would have been understandable as Iverson has,
during the course of his career, developed a reputation as a "bad boy" as well as "a
misogynist, homophobic, violent ego-maniac." Transcript of The Tony and Mike Show (Oct.
13,
2000),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srvliveonline/00/sports/tkwilbon/
tkwilbonl01300.htm (quoting Michael Wilbon); Same Old Allen Iverson? Look Again (Nov.
Il, 2000), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/nba/news/2000/l 1/1 1/iversonap/index.
html.
256. Indeed, less than two months earlier, Sports Illustrated featured MLB player
Nomar Garciapparra shirtless on its cover. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 5, 2001, cover page.
257. Reilly, supra note 248, at 94. Reilly's description of Iverson's appearance as "hiphop to his heart" should not be taken to suggest Iverson's appearance is any more reflective of
hip-hop culture than an entirely dissimilar appearance. For instance, Grammy-award winning
hip-hop artist Kanye West famously favors "preppy" designer clothing. See Kanye West To
Launch Clothing Line, http://www.manchic.com/manchic/2005/09ikanye.-west to_l.html
(last visited Sept. 16, 2009); Mike Pattenden, Kanye West ; ExtraordinaryLA Wardrobe,
MAIL ONLINE, Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/moslive/article-486092/KanyeWests-extraordinary-LA-wardrobe.html (describing West as a "fashion revolutionary" and
detailing aspects of his expansive wardrobe). While West, attired in "preppy" clothing, is no
less reflective of hip-hop culture than Iverson at his most comfortable, Iverson's image is
reasonably viewed as more reflective of the hip-hop caricature than West's.
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the potentially offending accoutrements.258 The magazine editors,
without Iverson's knowledge, airbrushed away his diamond earrings,
his necklace and several of his tattoos." 9
a.

Legislating an Image Overhaul

Unable, of course, to airbrush away the tattoos, jewelry and hiphop inspired outerwear of an increasing number of players bedecked as
Iverson often was, the NBA, in 2005, took a more broad-based
approach to repackaging its players. It instituted a dress code seemingly
aimed at, among other things, suppressing hip-hop expression. '
While the NBA's systematic drive to alter its image began years
earlier, a dramatic brawl during a game between the league's Detroit
Pistons and Indiana Pacers catalyzed its action. 6 ' During the fight,
members of the Pacers entered the stands and fought with some
258. Rick Reilly, Stillin There Chuckin" SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 18, 2000, at 180.
Although NBA Commissioner David Stern reprimanded the Hoop Magazine editor in chief
after the issue's publication, Mike Wise, In the Paint, N.Y TMES, June 4, 2003, at Dl, the
Hoop Magazine incident was not the first instance of an NBA publication attempting to
decouple Iverson from his tattoos. Indeed, just a year earlier, the NBA's Inside Stuff
Magazine published an Iverson picture with one of his tattoos "strategically cropped out of
the photo." Darren Rovell, Iverson Has Given NBA New Credibility (Feb. 26, 2003),
http://assets.espn.go.com/nba/s/2003/0226/1514649.html.
259. Reilly, supra note 258, at 180. Iverson strongly objected to the NBA's attempt to
accept some components of his person while rejecting others, explaining, "[The photo] was
an insult, terrible .... I wish they wouldn't use me at all if they can't accept all of me." Allen
Iverson Live, Tattoos, http://www.alleniversonlive.com/tattoos (last visited Sept. 20, 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
260. Mike Wise, Opinions on the NBA Dress Code Are Farfrom Uniform, WASH.
POST, Oct. 23, 2005, at A1; BBC Sport, NBA Dress Code Upsets Black Stars (Oct. 31, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/othersportsibasketball/4392182.stm
(noting that NBA
Commissioner David Stern argues the dress code is not aimed at hip-hop dress, but at
"sloppy" dress).
261. HARVEY ARATON, CRASHING THE BORDERS: How BASKETBALL WON THE WORLD
AND LOST ITS SOUL AT HOME 175 (2005). A more recent set of incidents that sullied the
NBA's reputation were the activities surrounding the NBA's All-Star Weekend celebration in
Las Vegas in February of 2007. Disparagingly dubbed "hip-hop Woodstock," the weekend
was derided as a hip-hop criminal romp and a disgrace to the NBA. See Bill Simmons,
Welcome to Hip-Hop Woodstock (Feb. 22, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/
story?page=simmons/070220. ESPN journalist Scoop Jackson, while acknowledging the
existence of hooliganism during the All-Star Weekend celebration, describes the media
coverage of the incidents-much like the media coverage of the NBA generally-as racially
infused, unfairly critical of hip-hop culture, and exaggerated. Scoop Jackson, What Really
Happened in Vegas? (Feb. 28, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=
jackson/070228. Jackson notes that the arrest totals during the weekend were indeed high,
but were dwarfed by arrest totals during a similarly festive event just two months earlier-the
Las Vegas New Year's Eve celebration. Id. Jackson attributes the disparity in concern over
the two episodes of lawlessness to racial prejudice and, more particularly, a racially-inspired
distaste for NBA culture. Id.
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Pistons fans. 62 The players were black, the fans were white, and the

battle, in many ways, metaphorically symbolized the distance and
disassociation between the NBA's overwhelmingly white gameattendees and its overwhelmingly black players. 263 NBA Commissioner
David Stem, who in the fight's wake, reportedly expressed significant
concern that the league "was experiencing disconnect from red-state
America" acted quickly.24 He hired Matthew Dowd, "a Texas-based
business strategist who had helped shape George W Bush's [2004
presidential] reelection campaign, to create a blueprint for the league
on broadening its appeal."265
Within a year, the NBA legislated a number of restrictions on
player attire while players were "engaged in team or league business,"
which is to say while players were traveling to and from games and
practices and, if not in uniform, while they were present at games and
practices."' Specifically, players were prohibited from, among other
things, wearing sleeveless shirts, untucked shirts, shorts and visible
medallions.6 7 Taken together, these restrictions achieved, on a leaguewide level, what Hoop Magazine's airbrushing achieved with regard to
Iverson alone. The restrictions hid tattoos, covered jewelry, and, in
addition, rendered obsolete the oversized throwback athletic jerseys
and baggy pants many players favored.
The dress code sparked various reactions. Many observers
viewed the code as eminently reasonable.268 Others, including many
262. Greg Sandoval, ChargesTo Be Filed in Pistons-PacersBrawl: Officials Say Fans,
Players WillBe HeldAccountable,WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2004, at D7.
263. Harvey Araton, One Year Aller Pacers-PistonsFight, Tough Questions of Race
and Sports, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 2005, § 8, at 1 (discussing the Pacers-Pistons brawl and

referencing the steadily increasing "gulf" between the NBA's white fans and its black
players).
264.

ARATON, supra note 261, at 175.

265. Central to the NBA's strategy was pressing the National Basketball Players
Association (NBPA)--the union representing NBA players-to accede to a minimum age
requirement for NBA players. Id.The NBPA ultimately agreed. Beginning in 2006, the
league decreed that a player must be at least nineteen years old and one year removed from
high school before he may be eligible for the NBA draft. Brian Shaffer, Comment, The
NBA Age Requirement Shoots andMisses: How the Non-Statutory Exemption Produces
Inequitable Results for High School Basketball Stars, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 681, 682

(2008).
266. Michael A. McCann, The Reckless PursuitofDominion: A SituationalAnalysis
of the NBA and DiminishingPlayerAutonomy,8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMp. L. 819, 827 (2006);
NBA Adopts 'Business Casual' Dress Code (Oct. 18, 2005), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/
news/story?id=2194537.
267. NBA Adopts 'Business Casual' Dress Code, supianote 266.
268. McCann, supra note 266, at 829 (noting the broad-based support the NBA dress
code has engendered); Richard Lapchick, NBA Diversity Makes for a Pretty Big Picture
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NBA players, viewed the code as unduly restrictive and racially
motivated.269 Whatever the merits of these arguments and whatever the
merits of the code, the code clearly took aim at a form of hip-hop
expression and the players embracing it. 7'
b.

Pursuing a Personnel Overhaul?

While the code served to, at least in some respects and for certain
time periods, remove the trappings of this form of hip-hop expression
from hip-hop influenced players, author Jason Whitlock identifies a
more dangerous movement to weaken the hip-hop influence on
professional sport: systematic racial employment discrimination.
Whitlock suggests some NFL teams, having concluded that athletes
embracing hip-hop culture are "not good for business and ... don't
contribute to a consistent winning environment" have, to avoid such
players, intentionally "whiten[ed] their rosters."27' What is more,
Whitlock predicts that-as a consequence of this movement-within
ten years, the proportion of black players in the NFL2 will drop by
twenty percent-from seventy percent to fifty percent.1
(May 9, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=lapchickrichard&
id=2865144.
269. McCann, supm note 266, at 827; Jamie Wilson, NBAS 'No Bling' Dress Code
Prompts Racism Accusations; GUARDIAN, Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2005/oct/3 1/usa.americansports.
270. McCann, supm note 266, at 827-28; Marc Lamont Hill, The Barbershop
Notebooks. Thoughts on the NBA Dress Code, PoPMATrERS, Dec. 23, 2005, http://www.
popmatters.com/columns/hill/051223.shtml ("[T]he [new NBA] dress code is clearly and
unapologetically directed toward [suppressing] hip-hop culture."). Although the NBA seeks
to suppress hip-hop through the dress code, when marketing its hip-hop image proves
monetarily beneficial, the NBA seems anxious to do so. For instance, the NBA "has licensed
a videogame called 'NBA Bailers,' which pitches itself as 'the exclusive one-on-one
basketball videogame highlighting the "bling-bling" lifestyle of NBA superstars."' McCann,
supra note 266, at 828 (quoting NBA Bailers, http://www.hoopsvibe.com/nba video__games/
nbaballers-ar12627.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2009)). The NBA's own head coaches have
recognized and assailed the NBA's hypocrisy regarding hip-hop. Id. San Antonio Spurs head
coach Gregg Popovich, for example, has said "'on one hand, you're endorsing the culture, and
on the other hand, you're tiying to block the culture. It sounds almost duplicitous."' Id
(quoting Peter May, Polishing Reputation Is a Fashionable Trend BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1,
2005, at E l).
271. Whitlock, supra note 225. Whitlock points specifically to the Indianapolis Colts
and the New England Patriots, which at the start of the 2007 NFL season had, respectively,
twenty-five and twenty-three nonblack players. 1d Whether calculated or not, Whitlock
argues, their "whitening" has contributed to their success. Id.
272. Distressingly, Whitlock seeks to justify this potential demographic shift. He
identifies the negative behaviors of seven black NFL players he believes to embrace hip-hop,
holds those negative behaviors against all other black NFL players who may embrace hiphop, monolithizes the entire group as the "hip-hop athletes" and essentially calls for their
expurgation. Id.
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Whether Whitlock's prediction will come to pass in the NFL is
untold. However, considering the NBA's history of customer-inspired
race-considered roster construction, the last decade's groundswell of
opposition among game-attending NBA fans to hip-hop culture's
influence, and the NBA's myriad attempts, through technological
manipulation and attire restrictions, to quash the culture embraced by
many of its black players, the future Whitlock predicts would seem
welcome among the NBA brass. This possibility is, however, a
frightening one in that it would signal a disregard for one of Title VII's
most fundamental premises: individuals should not be denied employment opportunities based on racially inspired stereotypes. 73
Under Title VII, while terminating or refusing to hire players who
engage in rule-breaking conduct, whatever their backgrounds or
associations, may be justifiable, terminating or refusing to hire players
who embrace hip-hop culture for fear of an increasedpropensity to
engage in rule-breaking conduct is not. Therefore if a team terminates
or refuses to hire players who are black under the assumption that the
players embrace hip-hop culture, the players would clearly have viable
Title VII disparate treatment claims against the team. If, on the other
hand, the team effectuates a facially race-neutral policy to terminate or
refuse to hire players who embrace hip-hop culture because the team
assumes the players will be troublemakers, the players would be able to
argue under Title VII's disparate impact theory that the facially raceneutral policy has a disproportionate impact on black players. Either
way, NBA teams discovered to be doing what Whitlock predicts would
face both potential Title VII liability and a public relations disaster.
2.

Lightening the Eye: Internationalization as a Cure

The NBA and its teams, however, may, through internationalization, be progressing toward a future consistent with Whitlock's
prediction in a manner unassailable under either disparate treatment or
disparate impact analysis. 74
273. The EEOC's guidelines explain, "Title VII ... prohibits employment decisions
based on stereotypes and assumptions about abilities, traits, or the performance of individuals
of certain racial groups." Race/Color Discrimination, supm note 139.
274. While the NBA would seemingly be just as pleased, or perhaps more pleased, to
increase the numbers of talented white Americans in the league, white foreign players are, on
the whole, substantially better players than their white American counterparts. Michael
Wilbon, An Issue thatFollows the NBA Like a White Shadow,WASH. PosT, Feb. 19, 2006, at
E6. Washington Post and ESPN journalist Michael Wilbon attributes this disparity to culture
and confidence. Id. White American children, Wilbon states, are routinely led to believe
they cannot compete with black American children on basketball courts and are guided away
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In 1992, the United States National Men's Basketball team,
stocked with NBA stars and dubbed the "Dream Team," demolished all
of its opponents en route to winning the Olympic Gold Medal in
Barcelona, Spain.2"' Even then, however, astute observers, including
the Dream Team's coach Chuck Daly, realized the level of play
internationally, and particularly in Europe, was quickly improving. 6
Moreover, armed with the lessons learned from experiencing and
watching the "Dream Team's" triumph in Barcelona, players from
around the world further improved.Y Within several years of the 1992
Olympics, other nations' basketball teams had reached the Americans'
level, and the United States was no longer routinely annihilating
international opponents."'
Ultimately, at the 2002 Fd6rmon Internatonale de Basketball
(FIBA) World Championships, the United States suffered its first loss
after fifty-eight consecutive victories, and finished the tournament out
of medal contention9 Two years later, at the 2004 Olympic Games,
the United States team was again embarrassed, suffering a "threedefeat flameout.""' Over the course of just twelve years, American
basketball's "supremacy had281 given way to superiority, then to survival,
and, finally, to submission.,

from the game. Id. Wilbon suggests that white children from other nations, unburdened by
the assumption of basketball inferiority that so hampers white American children, allow
themselves to develop as basketball players in a way white American children do not. Id
275. ARATON, supm note 261, at 45, 52 ("After a game or two [in the qualifying
rounds], it was obvious that only a biblical act could beat the Dream Team."). At the Olympic
Games four years earlier, the United States National Basketball team, which was composed
of collegiate, rather than professional, players suffered an embarrassing semifinal loss to the
Soviet Union, after which the "American basketball establishment" determined it would field
NBA players in international competitions going forward. Id.
276. Id.at 48.
277. Id. at 136. The Dream Team's Olympic campaign, in addition to inspiring its
opponents to improve, is credited with generally "boosting international interest [in
basketball] to an entirely new level."
Renada Rutmanis, Foreign Players and the
Globalization of Basketball, in BASKETBALL IN AMERICA: FROM THE PLAYGROUNDS TO
JORDAN'S GAME AND BEYOND 165, 167 (Bob Batchelor ed., 2005).

278. ARATON, supm note 261, at 133-35 (detailing the United States' narrow win over
Lithuania in the 2000 Olympic semifinal round).
279. Id.at 145.
280. Id. at 170-71.
281. Id at 145. In 2006, the United States National Men's Basketball Team again lost
in major international competition, this time to Greece in the semifinals of the FIBA World
Championships. Bruce Wallace, Greece Takes Air Out of US. Basketball,L.A. TIMEs, Sept.
2, 2006, at D1O. By the time the team prepared for the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, China, it
had performed below expectations in international competition for so long that that it adopted
the moniker "The Redeem Team." Jay Mariotti, US. DistractedAlready Kobe to Europe?
Redeem Team Should Just Focus on Winning, CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008, at 55.
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Unsurprisingly, as basketball has improved world-wide, foreign
players have, in ever-increasing numbers, begun to ply their trade in
the NBA, the world's most competitive and potentially lucrative
basketball proving ground.282 As one commentator explains, "What
began as a trickle [of international players entering the NBA] has
' Whereas international players constituted only
turned into a flood."283
six percent of the NBA in 1993,2" by 2009, their numbers had

increased three-fold.85 As noted above, while some of these players
are of color, the overwhelming majority of them are white.8 6 Notably,
these white foreign players are generally not NBA also-rans, but are
instead some of the NBA's elites. 7
Basketball prowess alone, however, does not explain the NBA's
rapid internationalization or the vigor with which the NBA has
embraced it over the course of the last decade. 28 As Professor Richard
Lapchick, Chair of the DeVos Sport Business Management Graduate
Program at the University of Central Florida, explains, the NBA's
282. ARATON, supm note 261, at 137-38 (noting that one-fourth of the 2002 NBA draft
picks were used to select foreign players). Interestingly, as other nations' leagues become
financially competitive with the NBA, many NBA-caliber American players may begin
opting to play overseas rather than in the NBA, in essence "reversing the course of the many
international stars who have signed with the NBA." Rachel Cohen, Childress Leaves Hawks
To Sign with Greek Club (July 24, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/200807-23-1402889034_x.htm (discussing the decision of NBA player Josh Childress to leave the
Atlanta Hawks and join the Greek club Olympiakos); Ex-Hawk Childress Signs with Greek
Club Team (July 25, 2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3501488 (noting
that including Childress, five NBA players left the NBA for European teams during the 2008
off-season).
283. Daniel Eisenberg, The NBA' Global Game Plan, TIME, Mar. 17, 2003, at 59.
While substantial numbers of foreign players did not enter the NBA until the 1980s, it bears
noting that "[f]oreign players have always been a part of the NBA. In the very first game of
the 1946-1947 season, an Italian-Canadian named Hank Arcado Biasatti played for the
Toronto Huskies." Rutmanis, supra note 277, at 166.
284. Eisenberg, supra note 283, at 59.
285. See RICHARD LAPCHICK, THE 2008 RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD:
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 5 (2008), http://web.bus.ucf.edu/document/sport/2008rgrc-national_basketbalLassociation.pdf (reporting that international players comprised
eighteen percent of the NBA's players during the 2007-2008 season).
286. ARATON, supra note 261, at 141. As of the 2004 NBA season, forty-six of the
sixty-eight international players in the NBA were white. Lapchick, supra note 240.
287. Indeed, the NBA's Most Valuable Player (MVP) during the 2004-2005 and 20052006 seasons was Steve Nash, a Canadian. See Most Valuable Player, http://www.nba.com/
history/awards.mvp.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2009); Pat Hickey, Canada Abandons
Basketball, GAZETTE (Montreal), July 19, 2008, at D2. The following season's MVP was
Dirk Nowitzki, a German. Most Valuable Player, supra; Mike Wise, The Americanization of
DirkNowitza N.Y. TIEs, Feb, 7,2001, at Dl. Both men are white.
288. Rex Crum, NBA Turns to the World for Help (Nov. 7, 2004), http://www.market
watch.com/story/nba-looks-to-foreign-players-to-restore-image; Eisenberg, supra note 283, at
59-60.
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internationalization movement is economically driven.289 For starters, a
significant and increasing percentage of NBA merchandise sales,
which provide the NBA hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue,
now occur abroad.2" In addition, as Professor Lapchick points out,
"Fans pay to see winning teams and good basketball. If an international player makes a team better, it's good for the team and good for
the game."29' While these motivations must surely inspire the NBA's
ambition to internationalize, another economically driven motivationone tied up in race, racial dynamics, and the NBA's reimaging
campaign-seemingly plays a part as well. As New York Times
columnist Harvey Araton argued in Crashing the Borders." How
Basketball Won the World andLostIts Soul atHome:
Considering [Commissioner] Stem's insatiable zest for marketing,
given the way many teams during the seventies and eighties stocked the
end of their benches with white players to ensure a modicum of racial
diversity, it [is not] unreasonable [to hypothesize that] the accelerating
internationalization ...[is] purely dollar-driven with a residual goal of
loosening the African-American hold on the league.292
Araton is not alone in his speculation. New York Times Columnist Bill
Rhoden has asserted "the NBA actively grooms as many non-black
players as it can."" The NBA's increasing inclusion of European
players, Rhoden suggests, is a component of that grooming process:
"European influence may be on the rise ...because ...[t]here seems
to be a taste for a new flavor."29' Further, many of the NBA's players
agree that race may play into the league's trend toward
internationalization, expressing concern that it reflects, perhaps, the
league's attempt to "get whiter." 95
289. Lapchick, supm note 240.
290. Eisenberg, supra note 283, at 59.
291. Lapchick, supranote 240.
292. ARATON, supm note 261, at 140.
293. RHODEN, supranote 136, at 67.
294. William C. Rhoden, European Buildup Is a Put-Down, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29,
2002, at D1.
295. ARATON, supra note 261, at 138. It bears noting that internationalization has thus
far not substantially altered the NBA's racial demographics. See Lapchick, supra note 240.
This is attributable, in part, to dynamics stemming from the NBA's race-consider roster
construction phenomenon. Many NBA teams have traditionally stocked the bottoms of their
rosters with white reserve players so as to satisfy their fans' racial preferences without
replacing players likely to meaningfully contribute to the team's success. See discussion
supra note 135. As international players began to "flood" into the league, see Eisenberg,
supra note 283, at 59, teams accommodated them by jettisoning their least productive reserve
players, who, as a consequence of previous race-considered roster construction, were
disproportionately white. As such, internationalization has thus far resulted in white
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Even assuming the NBA does not intend that internationalization
spark a racial demographic shift in the league, such a shift is destined
to be internationalization's by-product. Professor Lapchick's Institute
for Diversity in Ethics and Sport reported that sixty-eight percent of
the NBA's international players are white and only thirty-two percent
are of color.296 Because nothing suggests the racial composition of the
NBA's international player population is likely to appreciably change,297
if that population continues to grow, as all indications suggest it will, a
racial demographic shift of some sort is inevitable.
Were MLS to permit internationalization as the NBA has, it too
would begin to experience a demographic shift-but in the opposite
direction. And just as the NBA vigorously embraces internationalization, MLS staunchly restricts it. Embracing internationalization and
the demographic shift naturally born of it, however, does not involve
application of any eligibility rule or standard. Rejecting internationalization so as to prevent the demographic shift it portends, on the other
hand, does. So while it is difficult to imagine Title VII applying in the
context of the NBA's seeming attempt to "get whiter" through
internationalization, Title VII certainly applies to MLS's international
eligibility rules which serve to disproportionately exclude players of
color.
VII. LESSONS ON LIGHTENING A LEAGUE: WHAT MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL STANDS TO LEARN FROM MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER

Taken together, the above analyses of the NFL, NHL, NBA, and
MILS suggest that the nature of internationalization's demographic
impact explains, at least to some degree, the leagues' regard or
disregard for citizenship status. Where the disregard for citizenship
status is likely to increase the proportionality of white players or
preserve the status quo, citizenship status is unregulated. Where such
disregard would likely decrease the proportionality of white players, as
is the case with MLS, citizenship status is regulated.
international players largely replacing white domestic players, leaving the overall numbers of
white players in the league roughly unaltered. John Walters, Does the NBA have Another
Great White Hope? (Feb. 11, 2009), http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/29116071.
296. Lapchick, supra note 240.
297. It bears noting that in January of 2008, the NBA launched the NBA China
initiative to promote basketball and expand the NBA's brand to China. NBA Announces
Formation of NBA China (Jan. 14, 2008), http://www.nba.com/news/nbachina_080114.
html. So, while there is no indication that the racial composition of the NBA's international
player population will significantly change anytime soon, it is conceivable that Chinese
players' numbers in the NBA may eventually increase.
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This pattern would suggest that MLB restricts the numbers of its
teams' international players. After all, as is the case with ILS, the
overwhelming majority of MLB's international players are of color and
hail primarily from Latin America and the Caribbean.' 8 While MLB
does not currently impose international player restrictions, an analysis
of its changing demographics together with the previously discussed
racial politics long existent in American sport suggest, perhaps, it may
soon choose to do so. Among the MLS Policy's dangers, therefore, is
that it provides MLB a discriminatory mechanism to emulate.
MLB, founded in 1903 through the merger of two previously
existent professional baseball leagues, 9 ' openly banned blacks for
decades before beginning to desegregate during the middle of the
twentieth century."' As opportunity for black players increased, their
numbers in MLB grew, and by 1975, twenty-eight percent of MLB's
players were black."' Despite its increase in players of color, however,
there was little threat that MLB might become-as the NBA and NFL
were fast becoming-a league in which players of color outnumbered
white players. Indeed, shortly after reaching that peak of twenty-eight
percent, the percentage of black major leaguers began a steady decline,
with promising African American athletes opting in greater numbers to
play other sports, such as basketball and football."' As of 2007, the
percentage of black baseball players in MLB had plummeted to eight
percent."' Even if, however, when the numbers of MLB players of
color were rising precipitously, MLB sought to slow that rise,
citizenship discrimination would have been ineffectual, as the great
majority of MLB players of color were Afiican-American. °
298. Almost sixty percent of MLB's 239 international players hail from either the
Dominican Republic or Venezuela. Larry Fine, International Players Comprise 28 Pct of
MLB Rosters (Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSSP84085
20080402. Many others hail from a number of other Latin American and Caribbean nations,
including Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, Curacao, Nicaragua, and Panama. Id
299. See THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA: THE COMPLETE AND DEFINrmlVE RECORD OF
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 6 (10th ed. 1996).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
301. DAVE WINFIELD, DROPPING THE BALL: BASEBALL'S TROUBLES AND How WE CAN
AND MUST SOLVE THEM 79 (2007).

302. Id at 60-61, 79-80. Author and former MLB player Dave Winfield explains that
football and basketball "have siphoned away the interest of young African American athletes"
because they appear to offer a higher chance of achieving wealth and fame than baseball
does, they are more popular on the college level than baseball is, and, at least in the case of
basketball, pick-up games require less equipment and fewer participants. Id. at 61-63.
303. Id. at 79. MLB has, in recent years, actively sought to increase interest in
baseball among black Americans and to eventually increase the ranks of black Major
Leaguers through a variety of MLB sponsored programs. Id.at 74.
304. Seeidat60-61.
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During the 1990s, MLB's players of color once again began to
grow in percentage, and the trend has continued through the present."'
This more recent increase, however, is fundamentally different from
the first, in that it is fueled by the incorporation into the League of
hundreds of foreign-born players. 6 Dominicans, Venezuelans, and
nationals of other Latin American and Caribbean countries appear in
increasing numbers on MLB rosters. 7 Notably, Latinos have played in
MLB since the early twentieth century.. and have maintained a
presence since."° In recent years, however, numbers of Latin American
players have steadily increased and have reached unprecedented levels.
Indeed, as of 2007, Latin American players accounted for nearly thirty
percent of all MLB players as compared with only thirteen percent in
1990.30 MLB's Latin American players are not only numerous, they
are also increasingly dominant." '
They12
' are, without question,
changing the face of Major League Baseball.
305. See RICHARD

LAPCHICK,

TItE 2008

RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD: MAJOR

LEAGUE BASEBALL 16 (2008), http://web.bus.ucf.edu/documents/sport/2008_-rgrc-major-

league-baseball.pdf. Whereas in 1990, seventy percent of MLB players were white and thirty
percent were of color, in 2007, sixty percent of MLB players were white and forty percent
were of color. Id.
306. Tyler M. Simpson, Comment, Balking at Responsibility
Baseball's
Performance-EnhancingDrugProblem in Latin Ameica, 14 LAw & Bus. REv. AM. 369, 37071 (2008); Jessica N. Trotter, Comment, Rooting for the "Home Team" How MajorLeague
BaseballandLatinAmerica CanBetterProvidefor the "Safe" -tyof TheirPlayers 13 Sw. J. L.
& TRADE AM. 445,445-46 (2007).
307. Simpson, supra note 306, at 370-71.
308. The Latinos who played in MLB before it desegregated were, of course, lightskinned Latinos. ADRIAN BURGOS, JR., PLAYING AMERICA'S GAME: BASEBALL, LATINOS, AND
THE COLOR LINE 245 (2007). While these pioneering light-skinned Latinos were, unlike

dark-skinned Latinos and blacks, permitted to play, it bears noting that they were often
disparagingly stereotyped and discriminatorily remunerated. Timothy Davis, Racism in
Athletics: Subtle Yet Persisten421 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 881, 890-91 (1999).
309. BURGOs, supm note 308, at 245 ("Latino 'invasions' of the big leagues have taken
place approximately every generation.").
310. SeeLAPCHICK, supranote 305, at 16.
311. ButRGos, supm note 308, at 243 (noting the "prevalence of Latinos among the
game's all-stars and annual award winners."). This is not to suggest Latin American players
are somehow inherently better than American players. Rather, many players reared in
economically under-resourced Latin American nations pursue baseball excellence, which
offers a potential path out of poverty, with a single-minded ferocity rarely seen in players with
more affluent backgrounds. Winfield, supm note 301, at 67 ("[I]t is the dream of practically
every young man in many Latin American nations to make it as a ballplayer. Indeed, there
are few other career options ... "). While impoverished American youngsters, as well as
those who are more financially stable, may pursue any of several sports with similar passion,
youngsters in many Latin American nations, in which baseball is wildly popular and has long
had a cultural "meaning that [goes] beyond athletic competition," focus overwhelmingly on
baseball. BuRGOs, supm note 308, at xiii.
312. WINFIELD, supra note 301, at 59-60.
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All indications suggest this demographic shift will continue. As
numerous as Latin American major league players are, Latin
Americans make up an even greater proportion of MLB's minor
league players-the players who will stock MLB rosters as current
3
MLB players become injured, experience declines in skills, or retire."
14
Indeed, over forty percent of minor leaguers are Latin American.
This rising proportion of Latin Americans in minor league and
major league baseball is no fluke, but rather stems directly from the
economics of player recruitment. Put plainly, finding and developing
baseball players in Latin America is far cheaper than doing so in the
United States. As such, pursuant to what has been dubbed the
"boatload mentality," all MLB teams recruit heavily in Latin America."'
Because the manner in which MLB teams scout Latin American
prospects and the signing bonuses they give Latin American prospects
are far less stringently regulated than they would be were the prospects
American-born, "[t]he teams can buy a boatload of players for the
same amount of money it costs to sign one player born in the United
States." 6' This allows MLB teams to evaluate scores of players, most
of whom will ultimately be jettisoned, in hopes of identifying a few
with the talent for major league success.3"7 This system, although
clearly exploitative, persists."8 And if it further persists and the current
313. Id at 74.
314. Id
315. BURGOS, supm note 308, at 237. It bears noting that MLB has begun an effort to
tap fledging baseball talent in China as well. See Jake Hooker, Joining China To Finda Yao
Who Can Hi4 N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/31/sports/
baseball/3 lyankees.html. MLB pays former MLB manager Jim Lefebvre to manage China's
national baseball team, and MLB's New York Yankees have established a Chinese training
facility reminiscent of those most MLB teams already have in Latin America. Id.
316. WINFIELD, supra note 301, at 66. For instance, in 2001, MLB's Cleveland Indians
spent $1.7 million to sign its top draft choice in the American amateur player draft while
spending less than half of that amount to sign forty Latin American prospects. BURGOS,
supra note 308, at 237.
317. BURGOS, supa note 308, at 237. Few of the players invited to join MLB teams'
Latin American baseball academies are legitimate prospects. WINFIELD, supa note 301, at
70. Most are invited, unbeknownst to them, "to fill out rosters, so that the true prospects can
have teams of adequate size in order to develop their skills?' Id. Of those legitimate
prospects who actually "graduate" from the academies, only twenty-five percent make it into
the MLB minor league system and fewer still, only five percent, reach the major leagues.
BURGOS, supm note 308, at 242. MLB teams are, therefore, "sifting through ... hundreds,
even thousands of prospects to find that one major league-level player." WINFIELD, supra
note 301, at 73. Because these prospects often quit school at a young age to pursue the
baseball dream, the consequences for those unable to make a living through baseball are dire,
as they are often qualified to do little other than cut sugar cane. Id.at 70-71.
318. BURGOS, supra note 308, at 237. The result of this recruiting system, explains
Venezuelan Baseball Players Association President Angel Vargas, is that "Latino children and
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demographic trend continues, it is conceivable that black and brown
players whose primary language is Spanish will, within a few decades,
dominate the MLB landscape and that white players will become a
relative rarity.
If, however, the majority of paying baseball fans remain white,"9
and if scholars Ilyana Kuziemko and Geoffrey Rapp are correct that
"the market for MLB players is characterized by customer discrimination,""' some ILB teams may-at some point--choose to decelerate
their Latin American recruiting mechanisms, so as to maintain a critical
mass of white players on their major league teams. 2 ' It is also possible
that MLB, as a whole, could seek to stem the tide of Latin American
entrants into its ranks. Even now, whispers circulate in the baseball
community of several MLB teams being too Latin. 22
If, indeed, MLB leadership chooses to reverse the League's
darkening trend, MLS-like citizenship discrimination would be an
ideal means of doing so. Through citizenship discrimination, MLB
could limit each team's number of international players-players who
are overwhelmingly of color-to ensure roster positions for domestic
young men [are treated] as commodities... as if these human beings were pieces of exported
fruit" BuRGos, supra note 308, at 237-38. It merits noting that MLB is aware of MLB
teams' exploitative Latin American recruiting practices, and some reforms have been made,
"but it would be a gross exaggeration to say that Major League Baseball has solved these
problems." WINFIELD, supra note 301, at 69; BuRGos, supra note 308, at 241 (noting that
average signing bonuses in the Dominican Republic have risen to roughly $30,000).
319. Although Latin American players constitute twenty-nine percent of all MLB
players, Latin American fans constitute only thirteen percent of all MLB in-stadium
spectators. Mark Hyman, The RacialGap in the Grandstands,Bus. WK., Oct. 2, 2006, at 7879, available at2006 WLNR 16906401. While Latin American attendance has increased in
recent years and some MLB teams are aggressively courting Latin American fans with
"Latino Heritage celebrations" and other such promotions, see id., there is no evidence to
suggest they will at any time in the near future constitute a majority of MLB game attendees.
320. Kuziemko & Rapp, supra note 137, at 140. Winfield asserts that fans watching
the semifinals and finals of the 2006 World Baseball Classic, in which Korea, Japan, Cuba,
and the Dominican Republic competed and from which the United States was earlier
eliminated, "didn't seem to mind" "that there was not a single Caucasian baseball player on
any team." Winfield, supra note 302, at 59. Assuming Winfield is correct that the fans did
not mind the absence of Caucasian players, this fact does not ensure, nor even suggest, that
these fans would be as accommodating of Caucasian players' absence from their favorite
MLB teams.
321. If an MLB team sought to limit the future inclusion of Latin American players,
abandoning a "boatload mentality" toward Latin American recruiting processes would
provide a convenient means toward that end. Because Latin American recruiting remains
intensely exploitative, such a decision would likely garner commendation from many
quarters, and the team's racial motivation might well go undiscovered or overlooked.
322. Helium.com, Are There Too Many Latino Players in Baseball?, http://www.
helium.comldebates/79391-are-there-too-many-latino-players-in-baseball (last visited Sept.
20, 2009).
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players, the majority of whom are white. No matter the skill of the
international players, their MLB opportunities would be artificially
capped and their numbers would reduce.
While the thought of an American professional sport's organizing
body taking affirmative steps to reduce a racial group's presence in the
sport may, at first blush, seem fantastical, it is well supported by
historical precedent. Consider, for instance, the sport of horse racing,
in which "African-Americans make up just a fraction of the riding
'
community."323
When horse racing was at its most popular, during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the great majority of jockeys
were black."' Over the course of a twenty-year span, however, exclusionary practices served to drastically reduce their numbers."' While
horse racing without black jockeys was inconceivable at one time, the
horse-racing industry's development of discriminatory licensing
requirements together with horse owners' concerns about blacks
dominating the jockey ranks served to systematically alter the horse
racing landscape such that horse races involving no black jockeys
eventually became the norm.36 Indeed, a glance at horse racing in the
twenty-first century scarcely reveals that blacks were ever meaningfully involved in the sport.327
Competitive bicycling has endured a similar phenomenon.
During the early twentieth century when cycling was a spectator sport
sparking "epidemic" interest among Americans across the nation,
blacks were heavily involved and, indeed, were among the sport's most
successful cyclists. 8 Blacks' opportunities in the sport were, however,
discriminatorily limited when, at the height of the sport's popularity,
the League of American Wheelmen, the then-premier national cycling
membership association, passed a motion prohibiting the admission of
new black members. 9 While blacks already in the organization were
not stripped of their memberships, the exclusionary rule sent a clear

323. Neil Schmidt, Black JockeyI Journey Spanned Different Worlds, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Apr. 29, 2002, at 1A, availableat http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2002/04/29/
spt-black-jockeys.html. Indeed, Marion St. Julien, who placed seventh in the 2000 Kentucky
Derby, is the only black jockey to have ridden in a premier race in over eighty years. See id.
324. RHODEN, supranote 136, at 69-70.

325. Id.at 75-76.
326. Id.
at 75-76, 78.
327. Schmidt, supra note 323 ("[Black jockeys] were ridden out of the sport, and
they've been sort of written out of the sport, too.").
328. RHODEN, supra note 136, at 86.

329. Id.
at 87.
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message as to the value the American cycling community placed on
black cyclists, and black cyclists quickly became novelties."'
The context in which rule changes thwarted the development of
black jockeys and cyclists was obviously quite different from the
context in which this Article suggests MLB could conceivably shrink
the ranks of Latino baseball players. Indeed, the former context was
characterized by far more virulent and overt racial animus and
discrimination than the latter. Still, the two factors enabling systematic
exclusion in horse racing and cycling a century ago exist in baseball
today: (1) the motive to discriminate, and (2) a means of doing so.
Assuming MLB and its teams are sufficiently motivated to decrease
the Latin influence on the league, the MILS policy provides an
archetype for a Title VII end-around: racial discrimination by way of
lawful citizenship discrimination. Title VII cannot tolerate such an
end-around. The MILS Policy, therefore, demands scrutiny not only
because of its discriminatory impact in the MILS context, but because
of its broader implications.
VIII CONCLUSION
Over fifty years ago, during the mid-twentieth century, American
sport matured mightily. One by one, America's premier professional
sports leagues abandoned policies excluding players of color from
participation, and as time has passed, the numbers of people of color
playing sports professionally in the United States has increased
significantly.
While some teams in the NBA, the NHL, the NFL, and MLB
may continue to discriminate, subtly, in constructing their rosters,'
they do so in spite of league mandate. In the MLS context, however,
teams may discriminate in constructing their rosters pursuant to league
mandate. Because of its demographic dynamics, MLS, through
imposing on each of its teams an international player quota, artificially
suppresses the numbers of players of color in the league. Whether it
does so intentionally or unintentionally, MLS is vulnerable to Title VII
challenge and, if sued, would face potential liability.
The MLS Policy is certainly concerning in its own right, but its
implications for the broader American professional sporting
community spur still greater concern. Internationalization in the NBA,
330. Id Ironically, black cycling organizer Frederick Scott allegedly supported, and
perhaps inspired, the League of American Wheelmen's segregationist effort, in hopes of
strengthening the ranks of his all-black cycling club. Id
331. See generallyDuru,supm note 4.
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the NHL, and the NFL either increases the proportion of white players
in those leagues or maintains the demographic status quo, and,
predictably, those leagues allow-and in some cases encourageinternational player participation. MLB's demographic dynamics,
however, are similar to MLS's, and MLB's continued internationalization will decrease, rather than increase, the proportion of white MLB
players. The MLS Policy therefore provides a convenient template for
MLB should MLB seek to halt or reverse its demographic trend. This
Article argues, however, that the MLS Policy may well contravene
Title VII's racial discrimination prohibition. It therefore demands,
rather than emulation, searching scrutiny and, perhaps, invalidation.

